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I. Introduction
In the waning days of the Obama presidency, Congress passed and the
President signed the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR).'
That law purports to extend the statute of limitations for actions to recover a
large group of items, principally art, stolen during the Holocaust.2 The new
statute of limitations would be either the old statute or a six-years-from-
actual-discovery statute, whichever is longer, to expire at the end of 2026.3
This article analyzes the likely results of HEAR.4
Part I sets forth the problems leading up to HEAR's enactment, including
the typical parties to these controversies, the informational difficulties
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1. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1528.
[hereinafter HEAR].
2. See id. at Sec. 5(a).
3. See id. at Sec. 5(a), (g).
4. The earliest attempt was by Jennifer Anglim Kreder before the Senate Report on the law
became available. See Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 20
CHAPMAN L. REV. 1 (2017). An article by Charles Cronin of the University of Southern
California, written shortly after HEAR's passage, is helpful in understanding the law. See
Ethical Quandaries: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act and Claims for Works in Public
Museums (Feb. 10, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2915
276.
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confronting both claimants and purchasers of art, and the elements of
recovery suits. Part II discusses the functions of statutes of limitations,
adverse possession, and prescription. Part III analyzes the details of HEAR
and explains its effect in typical jurisdictions. Part IV speculates on the law's
likely impact on the resolution of Holocaust art disputes. Part V concludes
that the effect of HEAR will be small in volume but large in particular cases.
II. Problems of Art Recovery Cases
A. THE PLAYERS
1. Original Owner's Representatives
Judging from current cases, the original owners of art seized around the
time of the Holocaust are dead.5 As such, the cases are being brought by
their heirs.6 Some of the heirs are the grandchildren and great-
grandchildren of the original owners. A curious aspect of these cases is that
often, the heirs are not direct descendants, but rather the descendants of
siblings or companions of the original owners.7 The main reason for this is
that a high percentage of the original owners did not have children8
In most cases, the original owner's representatives are individuals or, more
commonly, a group of individuals who had the consanguinity to the original
owner.9 One original owner left a foundation to support several colleges as
5. The only original owner I have found among the cases and newspaper articles is Erna
Menzel. Her case was first decided in 1966, more than half a century ago. Her husband was
already deceased. Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. NY County
1966), modified on other grounds 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), modification reversed 24
N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
6. See id.
7. As a legal matter, the closeness of the heir to the ancestor in consanguinity should make no
difference for purposes of inheritance. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, "an heir is an heir is an
heir."
8. The author is unaware of whether the lack of procreation among European dealers and art
collectors is unusual in general or whether it was unusual for European Jewish circles at the
time. It should be noted that the author's sample is quite small, composed of court opinions
and newspaper articles in which the author can determine the identity of the person from whom
the art was stolen and whether that person had children. In total, this sample consists of
twenty-two owners, only eleven of whom had children. A demographer who studies the Jewish
people reported that the highest childless percentage of a population he had found was twenty
percent. E-mail from Sergio DellaPergola, Professor, Hebrew University Jerusalem (Sept. 24,
2017) (on file with author). See Sergio DellaPergola & Judith Evan, Some Fundamentals offewish
Demographic History, in PAPERS IN JEWISH DEMOGRAPHY 11-33 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2010)
(representative was only surviving heir of deceased art dealer).
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his residuary legatee.o It is possible that an original owner's representative
might be a museum or a government," though such a case has yet to arise.
Most of the original owners were either art dealers or major collectors.12
This is reasonable. In order to make a claim, one must have proof of
ownership. A dealer would have kept regular business records indicating all
the transactions of his gallery. A major collector is more likely to keep
records than someone who has only a few artworks. Further, when dealers'
businesses were taken over in the process of Aryanization, it is likely that the
new owners would have retained the records of the business, causing the
survival of those records, absent war damage.3 Sometimes original owners,
unable to take their art with them, made notebook inventories of their
collections for easy portability.'4
2. The Lawyers
It appears that each heir of an original owner tends to be represented by
the same lawyer in all his claims.s This should not be surprising. Being
represented by the same lawyer has the advantage of economy, as many of
the facts that need to be proven will be the same from one claim to the next.
In the case of a wholesale confiscation, the circumstances of the confiscation
will be the same for all works. A second common fact that must be proven is
that the claimant is the heir of the original owner.
10. In Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008), the claimant was the Max and Iris
Stern Foundation, which benefits Concordia and McGill Universities in Canada and The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. See Max Stern Art Restitution Project, CONCORDIA, https://
www.concordia.ca/arts/max-stern.html ( ast accessed Jan. 31, 2018). As of February 2017, the
Foundation had recovered sixteen of Stern's works. Amah-Rose Abrams, FBI Restitutes Nazi-
Looted Painting to the Max and Iris Stern Foundation, ARTNET NEws (Feb. 9, 2017), https://
news.artnet.com/art-world/fbi-returns-painting-max-stern-foundation-853031. Toledo
Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (where the claimants were nine
heirs).
11. Some people leave their property to institutions or the state. The intestacy statutes in
some jurisdictions provide that if a decedent is not survived by a spouse or a relatively close
blood relative, the property goes to the state. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to 2-
105 (amended 2010) (stating if no surviving spouse or heirs of grandparents [first cousins or
their progeny], property goes to the state). Given the carnage of World War II, it is entirely
possible that an owner of art might have died without leaving a single surviving close relative.
12. See, e.g., Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 959.
13. For example, many of the records of the German Lempertz Auction House were
destroyed by bombing during World War II. See Vineberg, 548 F.3d at 53.
14. The Dutch dealer Jacques Goudstikker so listed his inventory or more than a thousand
works. See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 959.
15. Local counsel may be involved if the litigation takes place outside lead counsel's
jurisdiction, but it is likely that lead counsel will be the same in all cases. For procedural rules in
federal court, see Commencing a Federal Lawsuit: Overview Practical Law Practice Note 5-509-1323,
WESTLAW PRACTICAL LAw (2017).
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Several lawyers have represented different claimants in different cases.16
This suggests that a specialized bar has emerged focusing on art recovery
cases. Two lawyers have represented several different current possessors,
indicating a level of specialization on that side.17 One lawyer has worked
both sides of the street.'8 Both claimants and current possessors seem to be
represented by large law firms.19
It is likely that the fee arrangement with claimants' counsel(s) will be a
contingent fee.20 A claimant may win on some artwork and lose on others.
The contingent fee allows the lawyer to not charge for time spent on the
unsuccessful claims. Rather, it allows the lawyer to use the successful claims
to subsidize the time spent on the unsuccessful claims. It is likely that
lawyers for the current possessor charge on an hourly basis.
3. Third-Party Financing
It is not known whether it is common to provide third-party financing for
these claims. As noted below, there may be significant research costs
incurred to prove a claim.
16. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Matter of Flamenbaum, 1
N.E.3d 782 (N.Y. 2013); Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (claimants represented by Mr. Raymond Dowd). See also Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734
(9th Cir. 2007); Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010)
(claimants represented by Mr. Thomas J. Hamilton). See also Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2008); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (claimants represented by Mr. Thomas R. Kline).
17. See, e.g., Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (C.D.
Cal. 2015); Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010); De Csepel v. Republic
of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (current possessors represented by Sarah E. Andre
and Thaddeus J. Stauber).
18. Howard N. Spiegler represented the current possessor in Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d
293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) and in United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), summary judgment denied 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91464. Spiegler represented
the original owner in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010)
and in Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23526, at *9 (D. Mass.
1998).
19. See, e.g., Orkin, 487 F.3d 734 (Weil, Gotshal & Manges); Vineberg, 548 F.3d 50 (Andrews
Kurth); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d 278 (Andrews Kurth).
20. In an ordinary contingent fee case, the recovery sought is money damages, which is easily
divided. In art recovery cases, the remedy sought is the recovery of the artwork in specie. One
wonders how carefully the implications of a contingent fee based on the recovery of an asset
that might have sentimental value and is not terribly liquid are explained. See generally Eric
Helland et. al., Contingent Fee Litigation in New York City, 70 VAND. L. REv. 1971 (2017).
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4. Current Possessors
Current possessors are either museums or private individuals.21 Most
current possessors that have been involved in litigation are museums.22 This
is likely because of the difficulty of discovering artworks that are held
privately, whereas museum items are more likely to appear in exhibitions, in
published works, or on the Internet.
One might note that most museums in the United States are either private
or run as though they are private.23 These museums rely on substantial
private fundraising to accomplish their work and are usually sensitive about
their public image.
Some cases involve museums located outside the United States.24
Museums outside the United States are usually either part of national
governments or instrumentalities of governments.25 Some of these museums
operate under rules set down by legislation or regulations.26 They usually
have political or bureaucratic accountability but do not raise significant
funds from private donors.27
Some individual current possessors have purchased the art, while others
have inherited it from someone who bought it. Museums have occasionally
purchased the art28 but are more likely to have received it as a gift or bequest
21. See, e.g., Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (possessor
was Museum of Modern Art); Orkin, 487 F.3d 734 (possessor was actress Elizabeth Taylor).
22. See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2010) (current
possessor was Museum of Fine Arts, Boston); Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (current possessor
was Museum of Modern Art); Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 803 (N.D.
Ohio 2006) (current possessor was Toledo Museum of Art).
23. See KARL E. MEYER, THE ART MUSEUM: POWER, MONEY, ETHICs 26-27 (1979)
(discussing how the New York Metropolitan Museum, while built using public funds and
maintained by the city, remained under private control). See also Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis.
v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (where authorizing documents
referred to the relationship between local government and a group of private citizens as a "joint
partnership").
24. See, e.g., De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
25. See Geoffrey D. Lewis, Operation of Museum, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, available at https://
www.britannica.com/topic/operation-of-museums-398828 (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018)
(discussing the "national status" of museums outside the United States).
26. See id. (discussing the regulation of museums in France and legislation pertaining to
British municipal museums).
27. See Martha Lufkin, Portrait of Wally Case Settled for $19M, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Jul. 20,
2010), https://goo.gl/KjvLqt (discussing the Austrian government's role in settlement
negotiations and its influence over the museum foundation's board). See also MEYER, supra note
23, at 19-21, 64-67 (discussing the tradition of publicly-funded museums in Europe); but see
Geraldine Fabrikant, European Museums Adapt to the American Way of Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
15, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/arts/design/european-museums-
are-shifting-to-american-way-of-giving.html (discussing the general shift away from public and
toward private funding for museums in Europe).
28. See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
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from someone who purchased it.29 With a few exceptions, the current
possessors were unaware that the art had been stolen during the Holocaust.
B. INFORMATION PROBLEMS
1. Heirship
In 1945, Europe resembled a vast demolition derby. From London to
Stalingrad and from Sicily to Dresden, rubble was the most common sight.
World War II was by far the deadliest conflict in human history; between
sixty and eighty million people perished as a result of the war.30 In Austria, it
is estimated that over six percent of the population perished, while over nine
percent of Germany's population died.3' Soviet deaths are estimated at
twelve percent of the population32 Roughly sixty percent of Europe's Jews
died.33 In Poland, which had the largest concentration of Jews on the
continent, more than eighty percent of Jews died.34
In addition to deaths, there was massive displacement.35 Many people
were forcibly deported, while others left their homes either to escape
forcible deportation or to get out of the active war zone. When families
were deported, they sometimes ended up in the same concentration camp
but often found themselves separated. Sometimes people used false
documents to avoid deportation to concentration camps.36 Some young men
29. See, e.g., Meyer v. Bd. of Regents, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68510, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(gift); Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(bequest).
30. See Iris Kesternich, et al., The Effects of World War lIon Economic and Health Outcomes Across
Europe, 96.1 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS, PMC 103-118 (2014), available at https://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4025972/pdf/nihms461498.pdf (stating that between sixty-
two and seventy-eight million people died during World War II).
31. See id., at Fig. 1.A.
3 2. See id.
33. See Michael Lipka, The Continuing Decline of Europe's jewish Population, PEw RESEARCH
CTR. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/09/europes-jewish-
population/ (explaining that Europe's Jewish population declined from 9.5 million before the
war to 3.8 million after the war).
34. See DONALD NIEWYK & FRANCIS NICOSIA, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST
421 (2000).
35. See Giada Zampano, Liam Maloney & Jovi Juan, Migrant Crisis: A History of Displacement,
WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/migrant-crisis-a-history-of-
displacement/ (explaining that World War II displaced an estimated sixty million people).
36. See Pamela Druckerman, 'If I Sleep for an Hour, 30 People Will Die', N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/opinion/sunday/if-i-sleep-for-an-
hour-30-people-will-die.html (discussing how members of a Jewish resistance cell operated a
"clandestine laboratory to make false passports for children and families about to be deported to
concentration camps").
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even resorted to escaping to the forests.37 As one child put it, "They went to
the other end of the earth and they did not return."3
After the war, some Jewish survivors tried to return home. They often
found that their old homes were occupied by others who were not prepared
to hand them over.39 Jews were also sometimes victims of violence.40 Some
survivors were unable or unwilling to return home and lived in camps
established by refugee organizations until they could be resettled elsewhere,
often in Israel.4'
In short, it was often impossible to determine which members of a family
had survived the war and which had perished. Considerable resources were
devoted to reuniting families or to determining who had died by
organizations such as Yad Vashem,42 the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee,43 the International Red Cross,44 and the International Tracing
Service (ITS).45 Efforts to reunite families are still ongoing. Even in 2017,
families torn apart by the war are being reunited.46
37. See Franziska Reiniger, Solidarity in the Forest-The Bielski Brothers, YAD VASHEM, http://
www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/28/bielskibrothers.asp (last accessed Feb. 12,
2018).
38. "Ils all&rent au bout de la terre et ils ne sont pas revenus[.]" This is the central inscription
in Memorial des Martyrs de la Deportation (Memorial to Martyrs of the Deportation), located
on the east end of the Ile de la Cite in Paris. Memorial Des Martyrs De La D6portation, MUSSE
DE LA RSSISTANCE EN LIGNE, http://museedelaresistanceenligne.org/media5761A-MA (last
accessed Jan. 28, 2017).
39. See The Survivors, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM'L MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/outreach/
en/article.php?Moduleld=10007736 (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
40. See Sheryl Silver Ochayon, Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland After Liberation, YAD VASHEM,
http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/3 3 anti-jewish.asp (last accessed Feb.
12, 2018).
41. See The Aftermath of the Holocaust, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM'L MUSEUM, https://www
.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?Moduleld=10005129 (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018) (estimating
that "as many as 170,000 Jewish displaced persons refugees had immigrated to Israel by 1953").
42. Yad Vashem tries to collect as much information about the Holocaust as it can. The
organization tries to document those who died and those who survived. See Names Recovery
Project, YAD VASHEM, http://www.yadvashem.org/remembrance/names-recovery-project.html
(last accessed Feb. 12, 2018); see also Testimonies, YAD VASHEM, http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/
en/holocaust/resourcecenter/item.asp?gate=4-5 (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
43. See About Us, Amv. JEWISH JOINT DISTRIB. COMM., http://www.jdc.org/about/ (last
accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
44. See Restoring Family Links, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/
what-we-do/restoring-family-links (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
45. About ITS, INT'L TRACING SERV., https://www.its-arolsen.org/en/about-its (last accessed
Jun. 17, 2017). In 2013, the International Tracing Service opened its archives to the public and
sent copies to a repository in each of its constituent nations. The History of the ITS as an
International Institute, INT'L TRACING SERV., https://www.its-arolsen.org/en/about-its/history/
#cl802 (last accessed Jun. 17, 2017). The United States repository is the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC. Research Services, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM'L
MUSEUM, www.ushmm.org/remember/the-holocaust-survivors-and-victims-resource-center/
international-tracing-service/submitting-a-request-for-research (last accessed Jun. 17, 2017).
46. In 1941, a Jewish married couple from Lublin who had fled east left their two-year-old
daughter in a non-Jewish orphanage in Russia. The war separated the couple. In 1945, neither
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Because so many people were displaced after the war, a question remains
over who might be the current heir of someone who owned artwork that was
expropriated. Uncertainty regarding heirship has two consequences: first, a
person who thinks he might be such an heir will experience difficulties in
proving it; second, a person in possession of art stolen during the Holocaust
will experience difficulties in finding the person to whom it should be
restored.
This unanswered question of heirship has recently induced the French
government to enlist the volunteer efforts of the French Genealogical
Society to try to find the heirs of certain owners.47 To my knowledge, it has
parent knew whether the other had survived the war. The mother came to the orphanage and
took the girl. The father was locked away in a gulag in Siberia for eight years. The mother
remarried, and the girl took the name of her adoptive father. They went to Israel in the 1950s,
settling in Karmiel. On release from the gulag, the father called at the orphanage, but the girl
was gone, and the people at the orphanage could provide no useful information. The father
searched for his little girl, his only evidence being a photo of all the children in the orphanage,
including his daughter, which he hung near his bed, the last image he saw before going to sleep.
He remarried and had a family. In 1991, the father and his family arrived in Haifa, about an
hour's drive from his former wife and his daughter in Karmiel-if he had known where they
were. An American genealogist, Meyer Denn, spent 1997-2002 in Israel. He located the father
as one of his distant relatives. The genealogist met the father, his two sons, and a twelve-year-
old grandson, heard the story, and saw the photo. He could think of nothing further that might
locate the mother and daughter. Twenty years later, the genealogist received a Facebook friend
request from the grandson. He explained that his grandfather had died in 2003, but he had
taken up the quest for his aunt. He contacted the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. They
provided the name of the mother's second husband, the girl's married name, the address in
Karmiel and a phone number. The problem: the phone number no longer worked and she was
no longer at that address. Could Meyer Denn help? The genealogist posted a note on the
Jewish genealogy chat group, wwwjewishGen.org, looking for help in Karmiel. Twenty people
offered help. One was an attorney. When the woman sought was identified, he responded that
not only could he help, but he could provide precise information with the woman's permission.
She was his client whom he represented in the sale of her flat the previous year. She moved to a
retirement home. Contact was made, and on June 9, 2017, the little girl from the orphanage,
now seventy-eight, met her two half-brothers, and the father's grandson met her children, his
cousins. The grandson presented his aunt with the old photo that had sustained her father's
hope for more than half a century. The story is told in much more detail by Meyer Denn of
Dallas, Texas on the JewishGen Digest for June 7, 2017. Meyer Denn, Memory Lane: How My
Research Led to a Family Reunion and Summer Research Trip, JEWISHGEN DIGEST (Jun. 7, 2017).
For a similar Denn success in the 1990s in reuniting cousins from Czechoslovakia who hid in
cellars during war, see Andrea Hyman, 90's Family: The Roots of Ourselves, L.A. TIMES (June 8,
1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-06-08/news/1s-1850-1 family-history/2. See also
Holocast [sic] Survivor, 102, United with Nephew, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Nov. 20, 2017)
(Polish escapee to Russia learns that one of his younger brothers did not perish in the war.).
47. The only compensation received by the genealogists is the fun of the chase and the right
to be present at the restoration ceremony. The Ministry of Culture and Communication and
Genealogists of France Team Up to Search for Rights Holders of Identified Owners of Looted Works of
Art Recovered after the Second World War, MINISTRY OF CULTURE (Jun. 24, 2015), http://www
.culturecommunication.gouv.fr/Presse/Archives-Presse/Archives-Communiques-de-presse-
2012-2017/Annee-2 015/Recherche-des-ayants-droit-des-proprietaires-identifies-d-oeuvres-d-
art-spoliees-recuperees-apres-la-Seconde-guerre-mondiale. A Degas drawing of three ballerinas
has been returned to the heirs of one of them, Maurice Dreyfus. Henry Samuel, France Returns
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018] HOLOCAUST ART DISPUTES 203
not induced the French government o provide compensation for any such
effort.
Aside from the question of heirship, widespread dislocation after World
War II and the passage of time have probably reduced the ability of the
heirs, once they know they are heirs, to know what artwork their ancestors
owned that might have been stolen during the Holocaust. People who were
alive in 1945 who might have had contact with art that they remember
would be at least eighty years old today. For the most part, grandchildren
and great-grandchildren of pre-war owners are today's claimants. The fact
that many heirs are collateral rather than direct descendants of owners
makes it even less likely that they would have lived in or visited the homes in
which the art was kept. Claimants must rely on either records or family
stories in their search efforts for the current location of the art.
2. Potential Purchasers: Information Problems Relating to Chain of Title
A person seeking to purchase an artwork, like a purchaser of anything else,
wants to know that he will acquire title to the work. One does not want to
pay money for an item that may be taken away by the appearance of the
owner. If the purchaser wants some assurance that he will not lose the
artwork to its true owner, he can attempt to establish provenance through
catalogues raisonnes, auction catalogs, or documentation proving that the art
has not been stolen (obtained using a registry of stolen art). As set forth
below, none of these is a satisfactory solution to the problem faced by the
potential purchaser. I will discuss four tools to address authenticity and chain
of title issues (provenance, art registries, implied and express warranties, and
insurance) and show that each tool fails to meet the challenges associated
with Holocaust art.
a. Provenance
Provenance is significant because it can "help to shed light on legal title."48
Provenance means "the history of the whereabouts of an artwork" from its
creation to the present day.49 A "gap-free provenance" takes an artwork
from its creator to its present owner, with each transfer being a legitimate
Nazi-Stolen Degas Drawing to Rightful Owners, THE TELEGRAPH (May 10, 2016), http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/1 0/france-returns-nazi-stolen-degas-drawing-to-rightful-own
ers/. A 16th century Flemish portrait (perhaps by Joos van Cleve) was returned to the heirs of
Henry and Hertha Bromberg. Thomas Adamson, Healing Wounds, Looted Art Reunited with Nazi
Victims' Heirs, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/heal
ing-wounds-looted-art-reunited-with-nazi-victims-heirs.
48. Lawrence M. Shindell, Provenance and Title Risks in the Art Industry: Mitigating These Risks
in Museum Management and Curatorship, 31 MUSEUM MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 406 (2016),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09647775.2016.1227569 (explaining that
provenance, which is based on physical possession, is distinct from legal title).
49. Id.
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movement from an owner or another person with the right to sell or loan
the work.50
In the old days, the reason for establishing provenance for an artwork was
to bolster other evidence, such as connoisseurship or scientific evidence, that
the work was properly attributed to the artist who created it. Whenever
something is expensive, there are people who will attempt to turn a profit by
producing a similar work that they can sell for almost as much money. One
way of doing this is to create a copy of a known work of value; another way is
to create a work in the style of an artist whose work sells for high prices.5'
Even a young Michelangelo created a statue of Cupid in the Roman style
and aged it to make it look as if it had been created in ancient Rome and was
newly discovered in order to sell it for a higher figure.52
Provenance became important to assure that art was legitimately
transferred and legally exported in the 1980s and 1990s due to several
developments. In 1970, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) made available for signature the
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO
Convention), which contains provisions related to illegally exported
property and certain stolen property.53 It was intended to help stem the flow
of stolen or illegally exported artifacts from source countries to buyer
countries, primarily by requiring that an item either have a document
supporting its legal export or be located outside the source country by
1970.54 While not aimed at Holocaust art, the UNESCO Convention's
provisions were drafted broadly enough to apply to some such art. The
UNESCO Convention's main effect was focusing attention on provenance.
By the 1990s, a sizable number of countries adhered to the UNESCO
Convention and enacted domestic implementing legislation.55
50. Id.
5 1. See Colin Moynihan, Dealer in Art Fraud Scheme Avoids Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/3 1/arts/design/dealer-in-art-fraud-scheme-
avoids-prison.html (discussing the sentencing of a woman who fraudulently marketed paintings
by an unknown artist as works by Robert Motherwell, Willem de Kooning, and Jackson
Pollock). For other similar cases, see generally ANTHONY M. AMORE, THE ART OF THE CON
(2015).
52. Michelangelo Biography.com, BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/michel
angelo-9407628 (last accessed June 6, 2017).
53. U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, 823 UNTS 231 (Nov. 14, 1970), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/
001333/133378mo.pdf.
54. See id. at arts. 8-12.
55. The United States ratification was effective in 1983. U.N. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Signatories to the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO.ORG,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last accessed Feb. 12,
2018). The U.S. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act was passed in the same
year. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2016); Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Cultural
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Another factor, which elevated the importance of provenance if all you are
worried about is theft during the Holocaust, was the Washington
Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, a non-binding agreement
calling on museums to research the provenance of their works to assure that
they were not illegally obtained during the Holocaust.56 In addition, the
Association of Art Museum Directors promulgated guidelines instructing its
members to obtain as much provenance information as possible in research
regarding existing collections as well as research regarding future gifts,
bequests, and purchases.57
Provenance begins with assessing the physical item to be authenticated
from all sides.58 Important elements to consider include materials,
measurements, inscriptions, changes in the mounting, and documents such
as customs stamps, exhibition stickers, wax seals, dealer marks, other stickers
or stamps, and transport labels. Because many works are similar, it is
important to be sure you are tracing the provenance of the work you are
seeking to purchase. Sometimes the physical item contains important clues
about its whereabouts at particular times.
Provenance can be pre-fabricated, do-it-yourself, or a combination of the
two. The main sources of pre-fabricated provenances are catalogues raisonni,
auction sales catalogs and private dealer representations, and museum
websites. Comments in the case law generally overstate the utility of these
items.59
i. Catalogue Raisonn6
A catalogue raisonn6 is an attempt by a scholar or a group of scholars to
survey all the works by a single artist.60 It usually includes only the works
that the author believes are done by the artist, though sometimes an author
will include a special section for works of doubtful authenticity. Each work
is dated, described, and illustrated with a photograph, usually black-and-
Heritage Protection: Cultural Property Protection, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://eca.state.gov/
cultural-heritage-center/cultural-property-protection/process-and-purpose/background (last
accessed Feb. 12, 2018). By December 1989, sixty-five countries had signed or accepted the
UNESCO Convention.
56. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES ON NAZI-
CONFISCATED ART (1998), https://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/assets/princ.htm (last
accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
57. Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art During the Nazi/World War II Era
(1933-1945), Ass'N oF ART MUSEUM DIRS., at 3 (Jun. 4, 1998), https://goo.gl/sfppB3. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, §§ 2.2-2.3 (INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMs 2004), available at http://
icom.museum/fileadmin/user-upload/pdf/Codes/ICOM-code-En-web.pdf.
58. See NANCY H. YEIDE, KONSTANTIN AKINSHA & Amy L. WALSH, THE AAM GUIDE TO
PROVENANCE RESEARCH 11-15 (2001) (discussing the various aspects of a work of art that
should be examined to track its provenance).
59. See De Weerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987), where the judge says that
the owner could have discovered the whereabouts of a Monet stolen in 1945 from its entry in
Monet's catalogue raisonne, but that book was not published until 1974.
60. See Catalogues Raisonns, INT'L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH, https://www.ifar.org/
catrais.php (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
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white. A catalogue raisonni describes a work's publicly known history of
purchases, inheritances, exhibitions, shows, and sometimes references in
books.
To determine the utility of catalogues raisonne, the author looked at a few.
No sensible businessperson would rely on the provenance contained in a
catalogue raisonni for the proposition that the artwork was never stolen. A
good example of provenance provided by a catalogue raisonni is Claude
Monet's Vernon (1886): bought from Monet by Durand-Ruel,61 October
1890; Samuel Untermyer, New York 1892; Durand Ruel, 1892; Potter
Palmer, Chicago 1892; private collector, United States around 1973.62 This
is a good provenance because it appears that the art was not located in
Europe between 1933 and 1945. If you are buying from someone
representing the American private collector, you have a complete chain of
ownership from the artist. Presumably, you are buying from a dealer or at
an auction and, unless the dealer who is trying to sell the work reveals the
name of the American collector (and they usually will not), you do not know
their identity. This provenance also does not specifically state that each
purchase was from the previous owner.63 While it is theoretically possible
that Potter Palmer sold the work in 1973 to the private collector, it is more
likely that Palmer died before 1973, and the work was included in his
probate estate. In short, it looks like a perfect provenance, but it is hardly
one on which the author would be willing to risk a million dollars; you
cannot verify that the provenance is accurate.64
61. Paul Durand-Ruel (1831-1922) bought about 1,000 works by Monet and similar numbers
from other Impressionists. Durand-Ruel was one of Monet's major dealers. He barely averted
bankruptcy but promoted the work of his stable of Impressionist artists by carefully controlling
the amount of their work that hit the market at any time and by assuring-sometimes by
purchasing works himself-that each auction set a record. He staged lavish shows of their
work, used artist biographies to stir interest, and went abroad-most spectacularly to the
United States-to promote their work. See Ken Johnson, Paul Durand-Ruel: The Paris Dealer
Who Put Impressionism on the Map, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/2 4/arts/design/paul-durand-ruel-the-paris-dealer-who-put-impressionism-on-the-map
.html.
62. Translated by the author from DANIEL WILDENSTEIN, CLAUDE MONET: BIOGRAPHY ET
CATALOGUE RAISONNE (ToME II: 1882-1886) 188 (1979). The French is: "achete i Monet par
Durand-Ruel octobre 1890-Samuel Untermyer, New York, 1892-Durand-Ruel, 1892 - Potter
Palmer, Chicago, 1892 - P.A., U.S.A. c. 1973."
63. The Saint Louis Art Museum's online provenance for Max Beckmann's Portrait of
Valentine Tessier is a good example of a transparent provenance. It sets forth the owners and
dates of ownership, and states the method of acquisition and the documents on which the
museum relied in assembling the provenance. See Collections: Max Beckmann's Portrait of
Valentine Tessier, ST. Louis ART MUSEUM, http://emuseum.slam.org:8080/emuseum/view/
objects/asitem/13738/41 6/displayDate-asc?t:state:flow=e4b0a934-4c12-415a-a 1 da-c3f4867fa
35e (last accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
64. For examples of false provenances, see United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir.
2003) (where a dealer created a false provenance in a fictional collection in order to sell a
sculpture); AMORE, supra note 51, at 15-16 (detailing Wolfgang Baltracchi's creation of a false
provenance by dressing his wife in period clothing and taking photographs of her pretending to
be her grandmother with the artwork); Laney Salisbury & Aly Sujo, PROVENANCE: HOW A
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More important to the purchaser, he does not want to buy a work that was
ever stolen. While it is comforting to know that the work was not in Europe
during the war, that is no guarantee that it was never stolen.65
The Vernon (1866) provenance is not typical. A more typical provenance
was one the author found for a work supposedly stolen during the
Holocaust, restored to the granddaughter of the supposed owner, and
donated to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA). This is
Bernardo Strozzi's 1615 St. Catherine of Alexandria. The provenance
begins, "1947 private collection Genoa." That provenance is obviously of
no utility in determining whether the work had been stolen during the
Holocaust. From 1947, the work has a perfect provenance to the Samuel H.
Kress collection in 1949 and then at some unspecified date after 1961 to the
Columbia Museum of Art in Columbia, South Carolina.66 The 1949 and
post-1961 transfers can be easily verified, but can we know that the Genoa
collector actually owned the work if there is a 330-year gap in the
provenance?
Complicating the search even more, the author went to the Columbia
Museum's website, which repeats the provenance from the catalogue raisonne.
But, how could the work still be in Columbia when the author knew from a
newspaper article that it is at LACMA?67 Further down in the Columbia
Museum website, it is revealed that Strozzi painted at least three
representations of St. Catherine. A trip to LACMA's website revealed that
CON MAN AND A FORGER RE-WROTE THE HISTORY OF MODERN ART 73-79, 83-84, 95-97,
105-113, 115-119, 199-207 (2010) (discussing how a purveyor of forged art fabricated a
provenance by using fake catalogues for exhibitions and by smuggling works into major British
art libraries).
65. As a practical matter, a purchaser of artwork wants to avoid financial loss. One can argue
that all that is necessary to avoid financial loss is assurance that the work has not been stolen
within the statute of limitations. One of the longer statutes of limitations provides for a period
of six years. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3)(A) (West 2016). It should be enough to
establish the provenance of the work during the last six years. That would be comforting, but it
is insufficient. There are reasons for which the statute of limitations will be tolled. For
example, the statute of limitations does not run while the work is outside the jurisdiction or
while the work is fraudulently concealed. See Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B.
Goldstein, A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former
Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 79 (1995). The statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues which, as noted below, may
be as late as when the owner demands the return of the work and that demand is refused. See id.
at 74-75. Some buyers are not only concerned about possible financial oss. As a matter of their
personal ethics, such buyers may not wish to buy stolen art under any circumstances. The
theory might be that by purchasing stolen art, they are creating a market that may encourage
the theft of more art.
66. See Luisa Mortary, BERNARDO STROZZI 100 (1995).
67. See Christopher Knight, Recovered Nazi-Looted Painting on View at LACMA, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/26/entertainment/la-et-cm-nazi-art-
lacma-20131126.
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St. Catherine was at LACMA, but told nothing about the LACMA St.
Catherine's provenance.68
Re-examining the Strozzi catalogue raisonni, the author discovered a listing
of no fewer than eighteen other paintings of this saint, including three that
the author of the catalogue raisonni finds are not likely attributable to
Strozzi.69 Some can easily be eliminated from consideration as the work we
would like to purchase by using the black-and-white photos in the catalogue
raisonni, but that still leaves about a dozen similar representations, most of
which have little or no provenance. Would you buy the Columbia St.
Catherine if it were for sale? Would you buy the LACMA St. Catherine if it
were for sale?
"The degree of accuracy and completeness of the provenance varies
dramatically from text to text, depending upon the interest and skill of the
author. Generally, however, the author will have been in contact with
dealers and collectors and will be up-to-date on the movement and location
of the paintings."70 What the author must mean is that of the published
provenances, the catalogue raisonni is likely to be the most accurate and up-
to-date-at least on the date of its publication. A catalogue raisonni for an
artist is normally not published more than once a generation. It may
become dated.
ii. Auction Catalogs
The provenance set forth in auction catalogs, if you can find your work
listed in one, is equally summary. Here is the provenance for Egon Schiele's
Danae (1909):
Herr Kohn,71 Vienna (probably until 1928)
Rob Verlag, Vienna (acquired by 1930)
Siegfried & Gesche Poppe, Hamburg (acquired by 1961)
Dr Rudolf Leopold, Vienna
Achim Moeller Fine Arts, New York
Private Collector (acquired from the above in the early 1980s)
[Seller] Acquired from the above in 2007
The item was withdrawn from the sale at the last minute.72
68. See Saint Catherine of Alexandria, LACMA, https://collections.lacma.org/node/2111858
(last accessed Feb. 12, 2018).
69. Mortary, supra note 66, at 105, 106, 115, 121, 122, 126, 128, 131, 134, 137, 149, 157, 176,
179, 193-94, 206, 208, 215 (1995). Typically, catalogues raisonnis eparate those catalogues into
three sections: works that the author believes were produced by the artist, works that the author
believes were not produced by the artist, and works about which the author is undecided.
Within those categories, most catalogues raisonns are chronological; Mortari's is organized by
last known place of the work.
70. Yeide et al, supra note 58, at 22.
71. Given how common the name "Kohn" must have been in Vienna at the time, one wonders
about the utility of this listing.
72. Sotheby's Impressionist & Modern Art Evening Sale, New York, May 16, 2017, SOUTHEBY'S,
http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/2017/impressionist-modern-art-evening-sale-nO97 10
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Or the provenance for Max Pechstein's Still Life (1919), from the same
sale:73
Galerie Gurlitt, Berlin (until 1923)
Dr. Karl Lilienfeld, Leipzig, Berlin & New York (acquired by 1932 and
until the 1950s or 1960s)
(possibly) Weintraub Gallery, New York
Emile E. Wolf, New York (acquired in the 1950s or 1960s)
Each of these provenances raises red flags because each passed through
the hands of dealers who handled Holocaust-stolen art. It is only a red flag,
rather than a condemnation. Each dealer also has a history as an
independent art dealer handling perfectly innocent sales transactions, both
before 1933 and after 1945. Leopold and the Leopold Gallery were
implicated in a notable New York case, again involving a Schiele.74
Hildebrand Gurlitt was one of Hitler's major art dealers,75 so anything that
passed through his hands is a warning for the provenance researcher.
Because Hitler did not take power until 1933, the provenance might be
satisfactory if you can verify the 1923 sale date. But, do we know who
Lilienfeld was? If you were a potential purchaser, could you be sure that
neither of these works had been stolen during the Holocaust?
These questions are relevant assuming that you can find an auction
catalog for a sale in which your work was sold. The first thing to know is
.html (last accessed Jan. 27, 2018) ("Danae" was this sale's Lot Number 27; a visit to this link
shows that Lot Number 27 had been pulled). The high and low estimates were thirty to forty
million dollars. Nate Freeman, Sotheby's Totals $173.8 M. at Sleepy Imp-Mod Sale, With $21.2
M. Malevich, Without $30 M. Schiele, ART NEws (May 16, 2017, 11.09 PM), http://www
.artnews.com/2017/05/16/sothebys-totals- 173 -8-m-at-sleepy-imp-mod-sale-with-2 1 -2-m-
malevich-out-front-and-without-a-30-m-schiele/.
73. Impressionist & Modern Art Evening Sale, #21, Still Life by Max Pechstein, SOUTHEBY's (May
16, 2017, 7:00 PM EDT), http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2017/impression
ist-modern-art-evening-sale-n09710/lot.2 1.html.
74. United States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egon Schiele, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), summary judgment denied 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91464. The parties
settled. The Leopold Foundation paid the Bondi heirs U.S. $19 million. The U.S. withdrew
its action. The Leopold Museum kept the work, and will permanently display signage with the
work detailing the painting's Nazi-looted history, and stating that the New York court found
that it had been the property of Lea Bondi Jaray from whom it was stolen by Friedrich Welz, a
member of the Nazi party. Dr. Leopold proposed that the Leopold Museum offer the Bondi
heirs U.S. $2 million, but the Austrian government refused to authorize that offer. The
Leopold's legal bills exceeded $4 million, and the case never went to trial. Martha Lufkin,
Portrait of Wally Case Settled for $19M., THE ART NEWSPAPER (Jul. 20, 2010), http://www
.theartnewspaper.com/articles/% 3 Ci-Portrait-of-Wally-i-case-settled-for- 19m/21273.
75. Hildebrand Gurlitt (1895-1956) was an art historian and art dealer who, despite being one
quarterJewish, was "one of four dealers to work for the Nazi regime" and was a collector for the
museum Hitler planned to open in Linz. Ruben Kalus, Hitler's Art Dealer: Why a Jewish Avant-
Gardist Worked for the Nazis, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/
hitlers-art-dealer-why-a-jewish-avant-gardist-worked-for-the-nazis/a- 19118028. See also
SuSAN RONALD, HITLER's ART THIEF (2015); CATHERINE HICKLEY, THE MUNICH ART
HOARD (2015).
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that the fancy auction catalog is an artifact of the twentieth century and is
more likely to appear with what was then considered high-end art. Even
with good catalogs, sales of particular works are hard to find. Many catalogs
are not indexed. Catalogs that are indexed tend to be indexed neither by
artist nor by name of the work but rather by the collector or by the date or
location of the sale.76
iii. Do-It-Yourself Provenance
Even where a provenance is perfect for your purposes, the "bible" on the
subject demands that we verify each step. "Published provenance
information must be critically evaluated and not blindly accepted, as
inaccurate information may have been repeated from one secondary
resource to the next without independent corroboration. Thus, it is vital
that every fact be confirmed and its source documented."77
If pre-fabricated provenances are less than conclusive in assuring a
prospective purchaser of art that she is acquiring title to the work, she might
consider a "do-it-yourself' provenance. This is a custom-made provenance.
It is put together from all extant records. What sort of records might there
be? Begin with the artist. Some artists kept careful records of their
production and disposition, while others did not. One might ask where an
artist's records are now. The answer is that those records, if they survived,
are probably in some archive. But, what archive? It would probably be an
archive near where the artist lived. It might be an archive where the artist
received university training. It might be at none of the above.71
Few archives have indices to their contents online. You may need to
actually go to an archive to discover if they have anything of interest. If you
are looking for records of dealers, some archives, such as the Getty Research
Institute, specialize in collecting the records of dealers.79 For some artists,
we know who their dealers were. That does not mean that the same dealer
will handle all initial sales by the artist. It most certainly does not mean that
the same dealer who originally sold the piece as the artist's agent will handle
a resale by the first collector to buy the work. Collectors have their own
dealer relationships.
Another locational problem is that most archives are organized on the
basis of the person or agency that created the record. If you know the name
76. See also YEIDE ET AL., supra note 57, at 243 -45 (providing bibliographic information about
auction sales).
77. Id. at 10.
78. Archives may also be found in private collections. For example, a collection of
approximately 4,000 items related to Edward Hopper (1882-1967) was held privately by the
Sanborn family. In 2017, the Arthayer R. Sanborn Hopper Collection Trust donated the
collection of archival materials to the NWhitney Museum of American Art, which has the world's
largest collection of Hopper works and gave the artist his first solo exhibition in 1920. See
Major Gift of Hopper Archival Materials Received by the Whitney, ART DAILY, http://artdaily.com/
news/97834/Major-gift-of-Hopper-archival-materials-received-by-the-Whitney#.WX7AlaKQ
xjU (last accessed Feb. 11, 2018).
79. See YEIDE, supra note 57, at 214-42 (listing dealer archives and locations).
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of the artist or dealer who created the record, that is fine. If you want to
know whether art was stolen during the Holocaust and whether it was
restituted after the war, those records may be scattered over different
government agencies of different governments. It is fortunate that many
records of the German government and its affiliates were taken by the Allies
and can now be found at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA) in the Washington, D.C. area.80
Once you locate the right archive and the right record originator, you are
then faced with the problem that archives generally store materials in boxes.
There is usually no index to the contents of any box other than a general
description of the kind of records the box contains. That means many
tedious hours of sorting through irrelevant papers trying to find the one that
mentions your artwork.
Also, not everything ends up in an archive. Heirs sometimes destroy
records that seem of no further use to them. Or, they move and take along
with them whatever was in the attic, to be examined at a later time. The
records of a small German dealer might be found in a dusty box in the Iowa
home to which his heirs moved in the 1960s.s1
Then, there is the linguistic problem. Take the case of a French
Impressionist painting that you know is now in the hands of a German
collector who wishes to sell it. You suspect that it initially went from the
hands of the artist to the hands of a French dealer, and at some point in its
life, it went from a French dealer to a German dealer. The records of the
artist and any French dealers will surely be in French; the records of German
dealers will be in German. So, your search for provenance will require
reading ability in French and German as well as some knowledge of how the
art world operates and how archives work. For those buyers of expensive art
who lack the requisite archival research skills, it is probably more efficient to
hire trained art historians than to do the research.
Of course, even when there is a published provenance, one should always
add do-it-yourself activity to provide extra assurance of its accuracy. This
option may require less cost than starting from scratch. In addition to the
matter of cost, there is the matter of time. Unless the prospective purchaser
pays for an option, she is not the only potential buyer for the work she is
considering purchasing. If the provenance research will require two months
and $50,000, including travel expenses for the researcher, she is likely to find
that the work has already been sold before the provenance research has been
80. For a list of Holocaust-related records held at NARA, see YEIDE, supra note 57, at 55-104.
Some of the most important U.S. groups that trace provenance include the Office of the
Military Governor (OMGUS), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the American
Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas
(Roberts Commission), and the Department of State. See id. at 55-56. German records held at
NARA include Nazi shipping records and inventories of confiscated collections. See id. at 64.
81. Email from Nancy Karrels, author of PROVENANCE: A FORENSIC HISTORY OF ART Uu.
20, 2017) (on file with author).
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completed. At the outset, it is impossible to state how long such research
will take or how costly it will be.82
Justice Holmes reminded us that "[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and
repose is not the destiny of man."83 One cannot expect provenance to be as
certain as a real estate title search. ". . . [A] great deal of provenance research
is, even for professionals, largely inconclusive because of incomplete sources
or imperfect access to information."84 The question for the purchaser
should not be whether the provenance is perfect, but whether it is good
enough to assure a reasonable person that he will receive good title to the
artwork. That will depend on the individual's taste for risk, but courts'
incorporation of provenance in determining diligence and other legal
matters makes the decision of whether to buy when the provenance is
inconclusive more than an individual's taste for risk.85
Sometimes the provenance is perfect, but the art is not. Mrs. Wallis,
embarrassed financially, borrowed money on the security of the paintings
hanging in the home she shared with her husband, a noted movie director.86
She did not want her husband to learn that she was pledging the paintings to
borrow money.87 She hired an artist to make copies of the paintings to hang
on the walls, while the originals went into the vaults of the lenders88 A
purchaser of the copy from Mrs. Wallis would find that she had a perfect
provenance, but he was buying a copy.
From the above, the author concludes that it is impractical for a
prospective purchaser to obtain a reassuring provenance indicating that he
will receive good title to the work. If the prospective purchaser is only
interested in a Holocaust provenance, that will be easier to establish than a
complete provenance, but it is still impractical in terms of time or cost.
82. Experienced provenance researchers working for museum clients normally charge seventy-
five to one hundred dollars per hour plus expenses. Law firms involved in litigation will often
pay considerably more. Email from Nancy Karrels, author of PROVENANCE: A FORENSIC
HISTORY OF ART (Jul. 24, 2017) (on file with author). In the case of artworks recovered from
the homes of Cornelius Gurlitt, the German government undertook to establish the provenance
of over 1,200 works over a two-year period and budgeted the equivalent of $2 million, hiring a
dozen accomplished researchers with experience researching in Germany, France, and the
United States. They identified 507 works that could not have been looted during the
Holocaust. Five works have been identified as looted; more than 500 works require further
work to determine their provenance. Melissa Eddy, Few Answers on True Owners ofArt Found in
Gurlitt Trove, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/europe/
gurlitt-art-collection-germany.html.
83. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
84. Email from Nancy Karrels, author of PROVENANCE: A FORENSIC HISTORY OF ART (JUl.
20, 2017) (on file with author).
85. For three good examples of provenance problems, two of which are unresolved and the
third in which a woman had four different names, see NANCY KARRELS, PROVENANCE: A
FORENSIC HISTORY OF ART (2017).
86. See Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 756 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
87. See id.
88. See id.
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b. Registries of Stolen Art
Taking a page from the law of property, there should be a registry naming
the current owner of every artwork that potential purchasers can consult
before buying art. Each United States jurisdiction has such a registry for
real property located within its jurisdiction.89 Each state likewise has a
registry for security interests in personal property.90 If such a registry
existed for art, all a potential purchaser need o is consult the registry to
determine if they are buying from the true owner. If the true owner is
unregistered, property law generally protects a good faith purchaser.91
Such art registries do not exist for many reasons. Real property cannot
move, whereas art is portable. The appropriate registry is the one
maintained by the governmental unit where the realty is located.
Furthermore, while agreed-upon descriptors make the identification of the
real estate certain, the physical descriptors for art such as medium, base, size,
and a description of the work, are nowhere near precise enough for a
registry. Additionally, many art owners are unwilling to register their art
because of privacy concerns, such as fear of theft, fear of the tax collector, or
unwillingness to be pestered.92
The law has not established incentives for registry. It is unclear that any
government would be equipped to handle the registry of all significant art
unless it could take advantage of economies of scale. The only perceived
benefit of registration is in case of theft, and no one believes that an art theft
will happen to them-until it does.
However, art theft registries do exist. Most theft registries are maintained
by "art squads" established by law enforcement agencies such as the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation, London's Metropolitan Police
Service, The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or
the Carabinieri.93 They cannot be searched by the public. The main art
theft registry, where a member of the public can order a search, is the Art
Loss Register (ALR). It claims to be the registry with the largest number of
89. RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICKJ. RoHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1045 (abr. ed.,
Matthew Bender 1968).
90. U.C.C. § 9-501 (Am. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
91. There are four types of real property registries in the United States. In a notice
jurisdiction, a bona fide purchaser is protected against a true owner whose ownership is not
detectable from the record; in a race-notice jurisdiction, a bona fide purchaser is protected
against a true owner whose ownership is not detectable from the record if the bona fide
purchaser records first; in a race jurisdiction, a person who records his deed first is protected;
and a period-of-grace jurisdiction operates like a notice jurisdiction once the period of grace for
recording has expired. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 89, at ¶¶ 913-18, at 1047-58.
92. See Judith L. Pearson, Establishing Clear Title to Works ofArt, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/art-auctions-antiques-report/
establishing-clear-title-works-art.
93. See Noah Charney, M.A. et al., Protecting Cultural Heritage from Art Theft, FBI: LAW
ENF'T BULLETIN (Mar. 1, 2012), https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/protecting-
cultural-heritage-from-art-theft-international-challenge-local-opportunity.
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items recorded, but that claim is not verified.94 ALR is run as a private
English company that is owned by individuals, major auction houses, and
insurance companies. In 2012, the company made a $1.25 million profit,
'mostly in fees for database searches, and much of the rest in recovery fees.'95
While ALR encourages people to register their art and antiques, one
suspects that there are few such registrations. What is mostly registered is
art that has been stolen. The fee to register a work is small.96 Some major
auction houses subscribe to the ALR's catalogue search service "to assist in
their due diligence process."97
Likewise, the fee to search ALR's database for an item is small, though
larger than the registration fee.98 ALR will also help the owner recover a
stolen work on a contingent fee basis for up to twenty percent of the value of
the work when recovered.99 Private individuals must request a search of
ALR's database; the registry is not available to the public.oo Requested
searches are carried out by ALR's "trained art experts."1o1 Whether ALR's
staff will honestly report the results of searches is unknown. There are
unverified rumors that ALR has occasionally falsely reported an item not
94. In 2013, the Art Loss Register claimed to list 350,000 stolen items. By contrast, Interpol
claimed it listed 40,000; Scotland Yard claimed 57,500; the FBI claimed 8,000; the Carabinieri
in 2014 claimed 5.7 million. Tracking Stolen Art, For Profit, and Blurring a Few Lines, N.Y.
TIMES 9/20/2013, www.artdaily.org 4/4/2014. The author finds those figures doubtful. One
can register stolen art with a police organization for free, while registering it with the Art Loss
Register involves a small cost. In 2017, the Art Loss Register claims 500,000 items, http://www
.artloss.com/services/loss-registration, last accessed 20 June 2017.
95. See Kate Taylor & Lorne Manly, Tracking Stolen Art, for Profit, and Blurring a Few Lines,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/arts/design/
tracking-stolen-art-for-profit-and-blurring-a-few-lines.htm (stating that the Art Loss Register
reported having "more than 350,000 stolen, looted or missing works" in its database); see also
Loss Registration, THE ART Loss REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com/services/loss-registration
(last accessed Feb. 13, 2018) (stating that the Art Loss Register's database currently has 500,000
items). But see Christa Roodt & Bernadine Benson, Databases for Stolen Art: Progress, Prospects
and Limitations, 52 INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES S. AFR. CRIME Q. 5, 9 (2015), available at https://
journals.assaf.org.za/sacq/article/view/26 (stating that Carabinieri, Italy's art crime unit,
manages the "largest databank on stolen art in the world" with one database "carr[ying] details
on some 5.7 million objects"). The Art Loss Register's figures are doubtful because one can
register stolen art with a police organization for free, while registering it with the Art Loss
Register involves a small cost. See Loss Registration, supra note 95 (stating the rates for loss
registrations).
96. See Loss Registration, supra note 95 (cost of loss registration is fifteen dollars).
97. Current Subscribers, THE ART Loss REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com/searching/auction-
houses (last accessed Feb. 13, 2018).
98. See Searching, THE ART Loss REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com/services/searching (last
accessed Feb. 13, 2018) (cost for subscription for twenty-five searches is $800 and cost of single
search is ninety-five dollars).
99. See Terms and Conditions, THE ART Loss REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com/content/
terms-and-conditions-of-registration (last accessed Feb. 14, 2018) (stating under Section 5.1
that the "Recovery Fee" is twenty percent of the "ultimate net benefit to the client").
100. See Searching, supra note 98.
10 1. Id.
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stolen only to notify the police about the potential buyer who is then left
with the problems, expenses, and time-consuming matter of dealing with the
recovery and the potential loss of his purchase price.102 Sometimes, items
that are cleared by ALR are later the objects of restitution claims.103
In 2016, Art Recovery International (ARI), another major stolen art
registry, announced the launch of Artive, a non-profit organization to
manage a digital art registry database.104 Artive was created to "function as
an expansion of Artclaim, ARI's pre-existing database project."105 Artive's
website proclaims that registration is free.106 Artive's online database is
public and individuals may submit searches after signing up for a free online
account.0 7 The organization's database is funded by "independent,
philanthropic capital," and Artive does not appear to charge any fees for
searches.10s
Because not all stolen items are registered, searching art registries does
not provide a guarantee that the prospective buyer will acquire good title.
c. Implied and Express Warranties
A purchaser can protect himself from financial loss by obtaining a
warranty from the seller. An implied warranty, unless validly disclaimed,
exists automatically in the sale of every item of personal property. The seller
impliedly represents that he has the right to convey title to the property.109
But, that assurance can be illusory protection for a purchaser. The statute of
limitations for recovering under sales law is usually four years from the date
of the transfer of title.110 Many purchasers do not discover that their seller
102. See Eileen Kinsella, The Art Loss Register is Entangled in Three Major International Art
Disputes, ARTNET NEWS (June 5, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/market/art-loss-register-
embroiled-least-three-international-art-disputes-305134 (discussing the story of a collector,
"who had a valuable Cezanne painting stolen in 1978 and recovered more than two decades
later, was forced to sell it in order to pay ALR's $2.6 million fee, which was based on the fair
market value of the painting").
103. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and In Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, at 10-11, Reif
v. Nagy, 52 N.Y.S.3d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
104. See Caroline Elbaor, Art Recovery International Launches Global Database to Protect Cultural
Heritage, ARTNET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/art-recovery-
international-artive-non-profit-cultural-heritage-749840.
105. See ARTIVE, https://artive.org/ (last accessed Feb. 15, 2018).
106. See Artive Account Registration, ARTIVE, https://db.artive.org/Account/Register (last
accessed Feb. 15, 2018).
107. See id.
108. See ARTIVE, supra note 105.
109. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977); but see J. P.
Ludington, Construction and Effect of UCC Art. 2 - Dealing with Sales, 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, *22.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 41, Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (governing international sales between merchants).
110. U.C.C. § 2-725; Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods
art. 8-11, June 14, 1974, 1511 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
limit/limit_convEEbook.pdf (as of June 1, 2017, thirty nations had placed this Convention in
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did not own the property until the purchaser tries to sell it, which is often
more than four years after she purchased it." In fact, I have found no case
in which a purchaser of art that was allegedly stolen during the Holocaust
discovered that possibility within four years of purchase.112
An additional problem, not present with most personal property, is that
the market for art fluctuates considerably. Recent fluctuations have largely
been upward.ns Receiving the return of your purchase price from your
seller is not usually the same dollar value as receiving the current fair market
force, including the United States, which ratified it in 1994). There are ways in which the
statute can be extended. For example, if the seller made a promise conditional on the
occurrence of a future event, such as "if you are ever deprived of possession, I will pay you the
fair market value of the work on the date you lose possession," the statute of limitations would
not begin to run until the purchaser is deprived of possession. Incorporation of such a clause in
the contract of sale might not secure the seller's assent. Even when the seller agrees, the utility
of the clause depends both on the seller continuing to have assets that can satisfy the promise,
e.g. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 291 (7th Cir. 1990) (where purchaser bought from a con man who might also have been
the thief; had someone bought from Goldberg, the promise would have been worthless because
of the Goldberg bankruptcy), and in the case of an international sale, the vicissitudes of suing in
a foreign country if that is the only place where jurisdiction to adjudicate can be secured over
the seller. For an example of such a case, but no indication of whether the buyer was able to
collect on it, see United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131(2d Cir. 1999). See
also Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990) (where there
was no clause making the promise a future promise, but the court found several ways under the
facts to extend the statute of limitations).
111. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66689 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (forty-eight
years); Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie's, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257
(S.D.N.Y.) (at least sixty-eight years).
112. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. NY County 1966),
modified on other grounds 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), modification reversed 24
N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969) (7 years, 1955-1962); Kunstsammlungen
zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir 1982) (20 years, 1946-1966); Cassirer v.
Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum, 153 F.Supp.3d 1154 (C.D.Cal. 2015) (8 years 1993-2001);
Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28364, 2007 WL 1016996 (E.D.Mich)
(more than 55 years, from at least 1959 to 2004); Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F.Supp.2d
802 (N.D.Ohio 2006) (75 years, 1939-2004); von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at
Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. den. 131 S.Ct. 1355 (2011), complaint dismissed
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39291 (46 years, 1971-2007); Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734 (9th Cir.
2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 491 (2007) (27 years, 1963-1990). Grosz v. Museum of Modern
Art, 772 F.Supp.2d 473, 477, 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (51 and 58 years, 1953-2003 & 1946-
2003); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (25 years, 1957-1982); Vineberg v.
Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008) (66 years, 1937-2003); Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v.
Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (59 years, 1948-2007); Dunbar v. Seger-
Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010) (probably 62 years, 1946-2008?); Rosenberg v.
Seattle Art Museum, 124 F.Supp.2d 1207(W.D.Wash. 2000) (probably 44 years, 1954-1998?).
In neither Altmann nor Portrait of Wally nor de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591
(D.C.Cir. 2013) was the possessor a purchaser. In each case, the possessor was either the thief
or someone related to the thief.
113. See Katya Kazakina, Art Market Trends Poised to Captivate Investors Next Year, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 23, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-23/these-art-
market-trends-are-poised-to-captivate-investors-in-i17.
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value of the work. It is unclear whether either the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) or the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Sale
of International Goods (CISG) awards damages measured by the current fair
market value of the work.114
An express warranty might cure this problem by providing a future
promise and by specifying damages equal to fair market value."15 Express
warranties require agreement of both parties, which may not be
forthcoming. Express and implied warranties are vulnerable to the
bankruptcy of the seller. In the case of a foreign seller, it is likely that the
case will need to be litigated in a court outside the United States in order to
get jurisdiction over the seller and to be litigated under non-United States
choice of law principles.116 There is also the problem that enforcing your
rights under either an express or implied warranty will require that you incur
legal fees that may not be reimbursable-even if you win."7
Provisions assuring title are a second-best solution. Most purchasers want
to know that they are receiving title. Also, the commercial system works
better-but is costlier-if people do not buy unless they are certain that they
are receiving title.
d. Insurance
Generally, insurance will not cover the loss of artwork because someone
else has superior title.iis The loss is more than just the fair market value of
114. The New York court awarded present fair market value in a replevin action, but it appears
that its reasoning was to induce the possessor to give up the art object itself, which he did. See
Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
115. But see Antique Platter ofGold, 184 F.3d at 133 (where parties agreed to "Terms of Sale" in
which seller promised to reimburse buyer for any loss due to government confiscation of
impounding, but there was no specification of how loss would be measured).
116. The jurisdiction problem can be solved by inserting a choice of forum clause in an express
warranty contract; the choice-of-law problem by inserting a clause choosing the law to be
applied. Both clauses need to be drafted carefully, and the express warranty needs to use the
terms in use in the legal system whose law is chosen. For a case where the exclusivity of the
forum choice was lost due to imprecise drafting, see AAP Implantate AG v. MI Glob. Grp. USA
LLC, 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 116167, *9 (S.D.Fla.) (ambiguity of whether the choice of forum
was exclusive construed strictly against party who drafted the clause).
117. One may always insert a provision for legal fees in a contract providing an express
warranty if the other party agrees. In some states, that provision is automatically reciprocal.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1717 (Deering 2016).
118. One can argue that this is theft, but it is not theft of the artwork, even though the net
result is the same: you no longer have the artwork, or the purchase price. Policies have specific
perils that they cover and specific exclusions. A sample homeowner's policy is found at
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 195-198
(6th ed. 2015). One exclusion is the seizure of property "by order of any governmental or
public authority," which would presumably include the courts. Id. at 186. Many insurance
policies will have a clause requiring that the insured have "unconditional and sole ownership" as
a prerequisite to coverage. Such a clause is violated if someone else has paramount title. 6A
CROUCH ON INSURANCE §91:51 (3d ed. 2012).
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the work; there are usually legal fees, investigative costs, and other expenses
of determining whether a claim to your artwork is valid.119
It is now possible to buy ownership insurance from at least one company,
but it is not cheap.120 The one-time premium varies from 1.75% to 6.75%
of the amount insured if the company is willing to insure you.121 The face
amount does not change with inflation.122
3. Information Problems of the Original Owner's Representatives
In order to bring suit to recover the property, the original owner's
representative must discover either the identity of the current possessor or
the location of the work. In most cases, discovery of one will be discovery of
the other. If the identity of the possessor is discovered, the original owner's
representative may sue based on in personam jurisdiction; if only the location
of the artwork is discovered, she may sue based on in rem jurisdiction.123 In
other words, the use of provenance for the original owner's heirs of a work
stolen in the Holocaust will be different from that of a potential purchaser.
The potential purchaser knows who currently possesses the work-or who
the current possessor's agent is. The potential purchaser is concerned with
its history. The original owner's heirs, by contrast, are initially unconcerned
with the work's history after it was stolen from their ancestor; their quest is
for its current whereabouts and custodian. Discovering either is usually not
easy or cheap.124
But, it may be both easy and cheap if the current possessor is a museum
that maintains a website with a full inventory of its possessions that is
indexed. Most museums do not list such an inventory online. An exception
is the San Diego Museum of Art,125 though getting to the place to start the
search is not obvious.
It may be convenient to divide a museum's possessions into three
categories. When an item arrives at the museum, the museum must decide
whether to add that item to its collection. That decision is called accession. If
119. See Kate Taylor, Insurance for Art Collectors Covers Ownership Disputes, N.Y. Sun (uly 10,
2008), https://www.nysun.com/arts/insurance-for-art-collectors-covers-ownership/81553/.
120. See id. (citing the challenging process of searching for art title as one of the reasons
services from ARIS, a company offering art title insurance, come at a high cost).
12 1. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1365-74 (2011). See generally Morris E. Cohn, Jurisdiction in Actions in
Rem and in Personam, ST. Louis L. REV. 170 (1929).
124. In the case of the Max and Iris Stern Foundation, it required substantial work to identify
the work of which Stern was deprived. This work involved using auction records, Mr. Stern's
client cards-some of which were preserved, and substantial original research on the part of the
Foundation's staff. The Foundation has now identified 400 works, about a quarter of which are
in museum or municipal collections. Telephone conversation Interview with Clarence Epstein,
Director, Max and Iris Stern Foundation (uly 20, 2017).
125. See Search the Collection, SAN DIEGO MUSEUM OF ART, http://collection.sdmart.org/kiosk/
search.htm?sid=4957&x=57307 (last accessed Feb. 18, 2018).
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the museum decides to make the item an accession, the museum registrar or
some other official will record the addition of the item to the collection. If
the museum decides not to proceed to accession, its possession is noted in
other records.
There are reasons to receive an item but not add it to the collection. It
might not fit the museum's collection but might be salable after some years
to produce funds that would permit the museum to buy something it
wants.126 Alternatively, accepting the item may be an accommodation to an
art owner who is a trustee of the museum, a big donor of money or art, or
someone who owns other work that the museum would like to add to its
collection. Accepting the item would allow its donor to claim a charitable
deduction for its fair market value on his income tax return.127
Most museums have only a fraction of the amount of display space that
would be required to simultaneously show their entire collections.128 One
might make a distinction between works that are regularly displayed and
works that are displayed only infrequently. It would be expected that the art
placed first on a museum's website would be items regularly displayed.
Items that are not part of the collection will not normally be placed online
even if they are in the museum's possession.129 If the work was listed on a
museum website, it would be both easy and cheap to discover that the
museum was in possession of the art. A quick search with your browser
would tell you.130
Before effective websites were available, museums would post works that
they thought had questionable Holocaust provenance to the Nazi-Era
Provenance Internet Portal (NEPIP).131 It currently lists almost 30,000
126. See I.R.C. §§ 170(e)(1)(B), (e)(7)(D) (2017) (requiring that the property be retained by the
museum for at least three years for use in its exempt function for the donor to receive a
deduction for the full fair market value of the item). The addition of subparagraph (7) made
this operation more difficult by requiring a certification by the museum of the planned use for
the item that is consistent with the museum's educational purpose.
127. See id. at § 170(e).
128. The San Diego Museum of Art has over 18,000 works in its permanent collection. It
probably does not regularly display ten percent of them. See Browse Highlights, SAN DIEGO
MUSEUM OF ART, http://collection.sdmart.org/ (last accessed Feb. 18, 2018). By contrast, the
next-door Timken Museum of Art displays all of its collection that is not on loan or in
conservation.
129. The San Diego Museum of Art claims that its entire 18,000 piece collection can be
searched on its website. The search engine requires that the searcher provide the name of the
artist or the work.
130. See Britta Lokting, A Famous MoMA Painting Makes Its Way Home-SO Years Later,
FORWARD (Dec. 6, 2015), https://forward.com/culture/325794/80-years-later-a-famous-art
work-makes-its-way-home/ (discussing the story of how the heirs of Max Fischer found
Kirchner's "Sand Hills in Engadine" by scrolling through MoMA's Provenance Research
Project).
131. Many European countries maintain comparable websites. For a list with links, see Links,
COMMISSION FOR LOOTED ART, http://www.lootedartcommission.com/NFVHQY50452 (last
accessed July 19, 2017).
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objects from 179 participating United States museums.132 Thirty-two
additional museums have certified that they have surveyed their entire
collections and found no objects with questionable Holocaust provenance.33
The database can be searched by artist name, nationality of artist, place or
culture of object, object title, object type, or description, and it
accommodates Boolean searches.134 Some museums continue to post works
with questionable Holocaust provenance to NEPIP as well as to their own
websites.
If the work is not on a museum website or is in the possession of a private
party, finding it or its owner would be much more difficult. In most cases,
provenance would tell you nothing.35 If from an auction catalog, it might
tell you where the work had been most recently, though even that is
doubtful given the insistence of most art owners on secrecy.136 You would
know the name of the auction house, but most auctioneers will refuse to
name the seller or buyer unless that party has authorized release of his name.
A New York court held that despite a statute that seems to point in the other
direction, an auctioneer need not disclose the name of the seller as long as
the auctioneer discloses that he is the seller's agent.137 For the same reason,
a catalogue raisonne provenance is unlikely to reveal the name of the current
owner. A museum show label or catalog might reveal the name, but they
more often designate the owner as a private collector.
In short, it is unlikely that the heir of an original owner would be able to
discover the current location or possessor of the work unless it were listed on
a museum website or on NEPIP's webpage. Beyond that, discovery would
be largely serendipitous.
C. ISSUES IN A HOLOCAUST ART RECOVERY CASE
A series of issues are typical in a suit to recover Holocaust-expropriated art
in the United States. Not all issues appear in every case, and additional
132. See The Nazi-Era Provenance Internet Portal Project, NAzi-ERA PROVENANCE INTERNET
PORTAL, http://www.nepip.org (last accessed Feb. 18, 2018).
133. See Museums Holding No Relevant Objects, NAZI-ERA PROVENANCE INTERNET PORTAL,
http://www.nepip.org/public/info/nocov.cfm?&menu-type=info (last accessed Feb. 18, 2018).
134. See Advanced Search, NAZI-ERA PROVENANCE INTERNET PORTAL, http://www.nepip.org/
public/search/itemsearch.cfm?action=itmdtlsrch&menu-type=search (last accessed Feb.18,
2018).
135. For an exception where both the catalogue raisonni and the auction catalog identified the
current possessor, see Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2007) (where owner was
Elizabeth Taylor, an internationally-known entertainment figure). See De Weerth v. Baldinger,
836 F.2d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1987) (where the work was stolen in 1945 and the catalogue
raisonni was not published until 1974, at which point the original owner had enough
information to bring suit to force the Wildenstein Gallery to disclose the name and address of
the purchaser).
136. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987) (where the Wildenstein
gallery refused to identify the purchaser of an artwork until ordered to do so by a court).
137. See WilliamJ. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh, 22 N.Y.3d 470,
478-79 (2013).
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018] HOLOCAUST ART DISPUTES 221
issues may be litigated in any particular case. It appears that these cases can
be extraordinarily complicated.
The first issue likely to be litigated-especially after the enactment of
HEAR-is choice of law for determining which jurisdiction's statute of
limitations should apply.13 There has been little litigation on that point.
The one case on the question, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum,139 is to
be commended for the clarity, sophistication, and completeness of its choice
of law analysis. Most cases assume that a single choice of law is appropriate
for all the issues in a case. Scholars agree that the laws of different
jurisdictions may be properly applied to different issues in the same case
when different jurisdictions have closer connections to different issues. This
is called depefage.140 Generally, the statute of limitations applied is the
statute of the forum state, either because it is procedural or as a result of the
Second Restatement.141
The next issue is whether the statute of limitations has expired. That issue
is explored with all the exceptions found in the jurisdiction whose law is
selected.142 If the statute of limitations has expired, the litigation is over. If
the statute of limitations has not expired, there may be issues relating to the
application of the doctrine of laches to bar the suit. It may be necessary to
perform a choice of law analysis to determine which jurisdiction's version of
the doctrine of laches should apply.143
The doctrine of laches will bar a suit if the plaintiff or one of his ancestors
knew about the cause of action and delayed bringing suit, and the defendant
138. See Symposium, International Legal Dimensions of Art and Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 921, 925-26 (2005), for a partial discussion of choice of law problems. Erik
Jayme, Globalization in Art Law: Clash of Interests and International Tendencies, 38 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 937 (2005); see Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts
Involving Stolen Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1177 (2005).
139. See generally Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F.Supp.3d 1154
(C.D. Cal. 2015), rev'd and remanded on other grounds 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
140. See generally Christopher G. Stevenson, Depecage: Embracing Complexity to Solve Choice-of-
Law Issues, 37 IND. L. REV. 303 (2003). See also Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F.
Supp. 3d 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (where court held that German law would determine
whether property was stolen, while New York law would determine whether laches applied and
the legal effect of a sale to a good faith purchaser).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 142 (Am. LAW INST. 1977)
(providing for application of forum law if the forum has a substantial interest in the
maintenance of the claim and there are no exceptional circumstances that make such a result
unreasonable). See also McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 227 NJ. 569, 599 (2017)
(adopting the Second Restatement position).
142. Typically, the statute of limitations does not run while the cause of action is being
fraudulently concealed or while the possessor of the property is not present in the jurisdiction.
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the tolling of the statute of limitations and the length of
the tolling. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177,1220-22
(1950); see CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 351 (Deering 2012).
143. A federal court sitting in diversity is obligated to follow the choice of law rules of the state
in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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would suffer significant injury if the suit proceeded.-* Significant injury
might include expenditure of substantial sums in reliance on ownership, such
as for conservation or restoration,45 or the fact that an important witness has
died in the interim.146 Determining whether laches exists requires discovery
to develop evidence about when the original owner's representative or his
ancestor discovered the facts that he needed, what the detriment was, and
when it occurred.
It is possible that there will be controversy about whether the claimant is
the correct representative of the original owner. The author has never seen
such an issue litigated but notes that there are two cases in which different
people were advanced as the heirs of Fritz Grinbaum.147 Contention is also
possible with respect to which jurisdiction's law should be chosen to
determine who the rightful heir might be, though that would require an
unusual situation.148
There might also be controversy about whether the ancestor actually ever
owned the art. This might involve a choice of law inquiry about which law
should decide the requirements for obtaining title, depending on the facts of
the case, as well as satisfaction of the substantive requirements of that law
with adequate evidence.
In most cases, the most significant question is whether the artwork was
stolen from the claimant's ancestor. Artwork, like other property, can be
transferred by a number of means. No case has held that the owner
abandoned his art during the Holocaust.149 In some cases, it is unclear
144. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 321 (1991) (action not
barred by the statute of limitations, but evidence should be taken on defendant's laches claim).
145. See, e.g., Huntington Library Launches 2-Year Restoration of 'Blue Boy,' U.S. NEws (Aug. 3,
2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/articles/2017-08-03/
huntington-library-launches-2 -year-restoration-of-blue-boy.
146. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd per curiam 2012
U.S. App. LEXIS 21042 (where "perhaps the only person who could have elucidated" how
defendant came to possess the artwork or whether defendant owned it at all had died).
147. The heirs of Fritz Grunbaum in 1997 were Kathryn and Rita Reif. See People v. Museum
of Modern Art, 93 N.Y.2d 729, 733 (1999). Less than a decade later, Fritz's heirs were Milos
Vavra and Leon Fischer. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66689, *2 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). It is possible that the Reifs assigned their interests to Fischer and Vavra or that the Reifs
died in the interim.
148. But, such a situation would perhaps not be so unusual for art collectors. Wealthy people
who collect art often have more than one residence, so the location of a person's domicile at
death might be in doubt. For a case where four states claimed that decedent died as their
domiciliary, see Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 401 (1939). See also In re Dorrance's Estate, 309
Pa. 151, 174 (1932) and In re Estate of Dorrance, 115 NJ. Eq. 268, 281 (1934) (each
authorizing its own state to claim that Mr. Dorrance was domiciled in its state at the time of his
death for purposes of imposing its inheritance tax).
149. See Menzel v. List, 49 Misc.2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. NY County 1966),
modified on other grounds 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), modification reversed 24
N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969) (holding that leaving your art in your
residence under duress does not constitute the sort of intent to abandon required by
abandonment).
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whether the transfer of possession was a bailment or a gift, but the question
was not litigated.s0 A person may also, on death, leave a piece of art to
someone who is not the residuary legatee,5' subject to the forced heirship
laws of some jurisdictions.152
Whether property was stolen or sold is the most frequently litigated
question relating to the original owner's disposal of their property. Some
typical scenarios exist: property may be taken without compensation;3
property may be sold, but the government prevents transmission of the
proceeds to the owner;5 4 the owner may be forced to sell his property at an
extremely low price to a Nazi in the process of Aryanization;55 or the owner
may "exchange" the artwork for exit visas so that his family might leave the
country. In all these cases, the decision maker is likely to find that the
property was stolen. In other cases, the owner might have sold the property
to raise money to buy an exit visa or to raise money because otherwise, the
owner would be penniless.156 In these cases, the decision maker is likely to
find that the property was sold, not stolen. The key distinction is that
property is stolen when it is physically taken from you or from your premises
or when it is taken using duress applied by the person who receives the
property, or someone with a family or institutional relationship to that
person. General economic distress is not enough to re-characterize a sale as
theft of property. In New York, the general rule is that once a person proves
that he owned the property and that defendant possesses it and refuses to
150. In a number of cases, artwork was sent to friends, relatives, or clients that might have been
gifts, bailments, or consignments. See, e.g., Matter of Peters v. Sotheby's Inc., 34 A.D.3d 29, 31
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006); see also Wertheimer v. Cirker's Hayes Storage Warehouse, 300 A.D.2d
117, 117-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
151. See, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002), affd on other
grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (where the court refused to honor Adele Bloch-Bauer's request
that her husband leave the golden portrait to Austria because it was only a request, not a
disposition, and because she did not own the painting at the time of her death).
152. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 913 to 914-1 (Fr.).
153. See, e.g., Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
154. See, e.g., Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff
alleged that his ancestor was forced to sell her Pissarro for the equivalent of $360, which would
be deposited in a blocked account to which she would not have access).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, *4 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
156. For example, Richard Semmel, a Berlin underwear manufacturer, was warned by a friend
in 1933 not to return from his Swiss vacation house. His German assets were confiscated.
Deprived of his regular source of income, Semmel had only what was available in his vacation
house. Running short of funds, he moved to Amsterdam and auctioned paintings there. See
Dan Hinkel, Lawsuit Settled over Renoir Painting Purportedly Lost in Nazi Persecution, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Dec. 6, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-12-06/news/ct-met-renoir-
follow-20111206_1_renoir-painting-pierre-auguste-renoir-nazi-persecution; see also Catherine
Hickley, Heirs Outraged as Dutch Panel Rejects Nazi-Era Art Claim, THE COLUMBIAN (May 7,
2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2013/may/07/heirs-outraged-as-dutch-
panel-rejects-nazi-era-art/.
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
224 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER [VOL. 51, NO. 2
deliver it, the burden shifts to the current possessor to prove that the
property was not stolen.157
In the typical Holocaust art recovery case, the thief has not retained the
property taken. The art was usually transferred several times after it was
taken.58 There may have been transfers at auctions where members of the
general public could bid and did so. Other transfers were sales to galleries
and to private collectors for fair market value. Under United States law,
these transfers are irrelevant. Numerous consecutive good faith purchasers
may intervene and none will receive good title. In many European
countries, with legal systems based on that of Rome, a transfer to a good
faith purchaser will give the good faith purchaser good title.159 In other civil
law countries, the period required to obtain a prescriptive title may be
shortened.160 Thus, for each purported transfer of rights to the artwork, a
preliminary question is what jurisdiction's laws will apply to determine the
legal effect of that transfer.161 That determination will be followed by
arguments about how that law applies to the facts of the case.
157. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y. 2d 311, 320 (N.Y. 1991) (cross-
referencing the Appellate Division opinion, which is quite brief on this subject); see also
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
158. In Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on other grounds 28
A.D.2d 516 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), modification reversed 24 N.Y.2d 91 (N.Y. 1969), we do not
know how the Chagall got from Brussels to the Galerie Moderne in Paris. Galerie Moderne
sold it to the Perls Gallery in New York, who resold it to List. In Bakalar v. Vavra, 819
F.Supp.2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd per curiam 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 21042, we do not know
how the Schiele drawing got from Vienna to Mathilde Lukasc in Brussels. She sold it to the
Galerie Guntkunst in Bern, who re-sold it to the Gallery St. Etienne in New York, who re-sold
it to Bakalar.
159. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
Germany's provision is phrased a bit differently. The German Civil Code (BGB) § 937
provides that title to moveable property is acquired by prescription after ten years, but not if the
person was not in good faith when he acquired the property or at any time during the
succeeding ten years.
160. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2010) (parenthetical). For an
American example, see LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 3489-91 (2017) (where the period for
acquisitive prescription is three years for a good faith purchaser under color of title and ten
years otherwise).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 6,222, 246 (Am. LAW INST. 1977).
Courts generally do not engage in serious discussions of this choice of law question. It was not
necessary in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 717 F. Supp. 1374 because it was
clear that the buyer was not acting in good faith to the extent required by Swiss law. In Bakalar,
619 F.3d 136, the court slid around the discussion by assuming that no Swiss person had an
interest in the case, where the Swiss seller in fact would have been liable to the New York
gallery for delivering nonconforming goods but for the possible expiration of the statute of
limitations. A serious discussion was avoided in Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594
F.Supp.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), by disregarding the interest of the Swiss seller because it was
wholly owned by a German. A better analysis is found at Cassier v. Thyssen-Bornemisza
Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 962-64, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Another potential issue is whether the original owner has already been
compensated for the loss. Different countries have established different
schemes permitting persons whose property was taken during the Holocaust
to file claims for compensation. Issues that might arise include whether the
original owner filed a claim for compensation, whether the claim included
the artwork in question, whether there was a final adjudication of the
question, and whether there was any legal effect of the proceeding on title to
the artwork. There is also the possibility that an exclusive repatriation
system was established by treaty, thus, barring the claimant.162 Current
possessors will argue that failure of the original owner to file a claim is
evidence that the original owner did not believe that the property was stolen.
In short, both the legal and factual issues in the typical Holocaust art
recovery case are complicated and contested. Resolving them is not quick,
certain, or inexpensive.
III. Statutes of Limitations and Adverse Possession
A. INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATUTES OF LIITATIONS AND ADVERSE
POSSESSION
Statutes of limitations and adverse possession attack the problem of stale
claims. It seems unfair to permit a claimant to prosecute a claim after a long
period of time when evidence has disappeared and memories have faded, so
that disputing the claim is likely to be difficult.163 In addition, statutes of
limitation, prescription, and adverse possession respond to a psychological
phenomenon known as the "endowment effect." It has been observed that
people will demand more to sell property that they own than they will pay to
acquire the same property.164 Attachment to property grows as the period of
possession lengthens.
A good illustration of the evidentiary reasons for statutes of limitations is
the landmark, but questionable, case of O'Keeffe v. Snyder.165 The artist
Georgia O'Keeffe alleged that three of her paintings were in Alfred
Stieglitz's gallery, An American Place, and that they mysteriously
disappeared in 1946. The paintings turned up in Snyder's possession in
1976. Snyder alleged that he purchased the paintings in good faith from a
man who inherited them from a Dr. Frank, in whose New Hampshire
apartment the paintings hung during World War II. There were two
witnesses who could have testified about whether the paintings moved from
An American Place to Dr. Frank's New Hampshire apartment as a result of
162. This argument did not succeed in De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094,
1100-1101 (D.C.Cir. 2017).
163. Simon J. Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums Initiation of Declaratoy Judgment Actions and
Assertion of Statutes of Limitations in Response to Nazi-Era Art Restitution Claims-A Defense, 23
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 302-06 (2013).
164. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow 282-298 (Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, eds.,
2011).
165. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 NJ. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
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sale, gift, or theft, but Alfred Stieglitz died in 1946 and Dr. Frank died in
1968.166 No paperwork survived them. The case settled, but had it gone to
trial, there would have been no way to prove whether the paintings were
stolen, sold, or gifted. The person with the burden of proof probably would
have lost, but in any case, both parties would have lost considerable money
in lawyers' fees.167
Most important today, the statute of limitations may permit a case to be
disposed of without incurring significant legal expenses. That is because the
fact determinations required for disposing of a case on statute of limitations
grounds are relatively simple and can be determined from the pleadings and
affidavits. Extensive and expensive discovery is not required.
Statutes of limitations are legislatively created. Though they are not
constitutionally required, it is common for the legislature to create a
limitations period when it creates a right. It is also common for the
legislature to create a limitations period when the judiciary has discovered a
right.
By contrast, adverse possession only applies when rights to property are in
question. The courts reasoned that if a possessor's rights could not be
challenged by someone claiming to be the owner because the statutory
period had expired, it must be that the possessor is the title holder and has
been the title holder since he went into possession.168 This legal fiction
immunized the possessor from actions for damages during his possession and
166. The settlement was confidential. It was rumored that each party took one painting and
the third was sold to pay the legal bills. See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL
HERITAGE, AND THE LAw 456-57 (Caroline Academic Press ed., 3d ed. 2012).
167. It is hard to generalize about lawyers' fees from case to case, and the general public would
not know about their size unless there were a case that resulted in the award of lawyer's fees,
usually to a successful plaintiff. The fees awarded in Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 815 (9th Cir 2003) amounted to almost $2 million for defendant,
and presumably a similar sum was expended by plaintiff. This was a trademark and copyright
case. It is difficult to know whether the fees in O'Keeffe would have been similar. O'Keeffe v.
Snyder, 83 NJ. 478 (NJ. 1980).
168. See Chapin v. Freeland, 8 N.E. 128 (Mass. 1886) (where dissent's argument that the
remedy was barred but title remained with the original owner was rejected). Adverse
possession's origin is found in Norman times in England. After Domesday Book, there was no
method of recording changes in the ownership of land. Land was transferred by going on the
property and enacting a ceremony of transfer involving the physical transfer of a twig or a clod
of dirt accompanied by promises. Sometimes a charter of foeffment, the ancestor of the deed,
was signed to commemorate the ceremony, but it was the ceremony that effected the transfer.
Even when there was a charter of foeffment, they were easily lost, and fires were a constant
medieval hazard. Witnesses to the ceremony died. Soon there was no economical way to prove
who owned the land, except that possession seemed to be the best evidence available. From the
thirteenth through the sixteenth century, your rights to land could not be challenged if you
could prove that you were seized-that is, in possession as an owner-since the occurrence of
some event, usually the ascension to the throne of a king. See, e.g., Stat. of Westminster I, 3
Edw. I Ch. 39 (1275). Each of these designated events quickly became dated. The prototype
for modern statutes of twenty-one years for real property was set by 21 Jac. I, Ch. 16 (1623).
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enabled him to convey a good title.169 The judicial gloss on statutes of
limitations for realty was extended by analogy to personal property.70
There are, however, two significant differences between realty and
personal property. For the recovery of realty, the statute of limitations is
relatively long, most being around twenty years, and few being shorter than
ten years.'7' Statutes of limitation to recover personal property are much
shorter. They vary from two to six years, and a majority of jurisdictions have
two to four year periods.172 The shorter period is probably justified by the
fact that realty is usually of significantly greater value than personalty. Its
consequence is that it is much easier to lose personalty by adverse possession
than it is to lose realty. The second difference is that realty is immovable,
while personalty is not.
Adverse possession requires that the possessor be in possession of the
property as a true owner would. This is normally expressed as possession
that is open, notorious, continuous, and hostile, but open and notorious
simply repeat each other. Possession of land is always open for anyone who
comes to the land to see. The same is true of vehicles that are normally used
in public places. It is not true for items of personalty that are normally used
in private, such as art and antiques. For such property, there is significant
dispute about whether adverse possession should apply,7s but none dispute
that a statute of limitations should apply to actions to recover the items. A
comparable doctrine, called acquisitive prescription, exists in most European
countries that base their legal systems on Roman law.174
A statute of limitations cutting off recovery without adverse possession is
only half a remedy. If there is a statute of limitations for the recovery of
property, it should always coincide with adverse possession. Leaving the
possessor in possession but without title impedes commercial transactions in
169. But, in the case of realty, it is not a marketable title. The "market" requires a paper title
that is not subject to challenge. A titleholder by adverse possession who wants to convey a
marketable title must win a quiet title action against the person who is the record titleholder.
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7 n. 1 (3d ed.
2000).
170. BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4.1 (WALTER B. RAUSCHENBUSH, ED., 3D ED. 1975);
BARLOW BURKE, PERSONAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 344-348 (3d ed. 2003); that extension
was made by statute in California. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (DEERING 2017).
171. CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE § 325(b) (West 2016).
172. The statement is made at Jodi Patt, The Need to Revamp Current Domestic Protection for
Cultural Property, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (2002), but note sixty-seven thereof only cites
fourteen jurisdictions; Patti Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L.
REV. 119, 121-122 n. 10 (1988) says that thirty percent of jurisdictions require three years, and
another thirty percent of jurisdictions require six years.
173. Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119 (1988)
(adverse possession should be limited to good faith purchasers); Steven A. Bibas, The Case
Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L. J. 2437 (1994) (placing risk of loss on
buyers requires them to internalize costs of searching or not searching title).
174. The American equivalent for personalty is LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 3489-3491,
providing a period of three years if the possessor acted in good faith under color of title. If
either criterion is missing, ten years.
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the property. The possessor cannot sell the property in a domestic sale with
the warranty implied by U.C.C. Section 2-312 that he has title; he cannot
sell the property in an international sale complying with CISG article 41 as
being free from a right or claim of any person.175 In each case, the seller
would need to insert in the contract of sale a clause disclaiming title.
Because such a general clause would significantly reduce the sale price, the
seller would wish to insert a clause precisely describing the state of the title
and the fact that the claimant cannot recover.
B. WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES
In most cases, the sticking point is not the length of the statute of
limitations. The sticking point is when the cause of action accrues because
that is the date upon which the statute of limitations begins to run. There
are four extant views.
Most important is the demand-and-refusal rule, in effect only in New
York. This rule is derived from an old case holding that a good faith
purchaser of stolen goods did not commit a wrong until he refused to return
the goods to the rightful owner.176 Because the refusal to return was the last
act that established the wrong, the cause of action accrued at that refusal.77
New York has been unshaken in adhering to that rule.178 The demand-and-
refusal rule places the accruing of the cause of action largely in the hands of
the original owner.179 He will not make his demand until he knows the
location of his art and its custodian, and until he is ready to demand it. One
would think that the statute of limitations would never expire in New York.
That is almost true. There are cases where the claimant does not sue
because the claimant is still negotiating with the current possessor, but the
court has found a refusal at a much earlier time.1so An advantage of the
demand-and-refusal rule is that it is normally easy to determine the date of
the demand and the date of the refusal. It does not appear to satisfy other
purposes of the statute like barring stale claims where evidence may be
unavailable.
Half-a-dozen jurisdictions apply the discovery rule, where the cause of
action accrues when the true owner discovers, or should have discovered,
175. United Nations Convention on Contracts For the International Sale of Goods art. 4, Apr.
10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668, (entered into force 1988).
176. Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 1966), modified on other
grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516, (N.Y. App. Div. 1967); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77
N.Y. 2d 311, (1991).
179. If the owner unreasonably delays making a demand, he may find the doctrine of laches
applied to bar his suit if that delay has caused detriment to the current possessor. See the
discussion below.
180. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F.Supp.2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (refusal occurred
during negotiations for return; court did not discuss whether waiver or estoppel applied.).
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what he needed to know to bring suit.181 To invoke the discovery rule, the
true owner must first establish that he has been diligent in searching for the
property.182 In discovery rule jurisdictions, two difficult decisions need to be
reached at the outset. The first is whether claimant was sufficiently diligent
to be entitled to the discovery rule.183 Second, if claimant is entitled to the
discovery rule, when should he reasonably have discovered what he needs to
know? Determining both of these questions will probably require discovery,
which can be a substantial cost, before the court decides whether it will get
to the merits of the suit.184
California applies the actual discovery rule for suits to recover works of
fine arts from a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer.-8 It also lengthens
the statute of limitations from three to six years.186 The cause of action
accrues when the claimant actually discovers both his entitlement and the
whereabouts of the artwork.187 The only question to be determined is the
date of actual discovery. Facts to make that determination are peculiarly
within the possession of the claimant, though it may be assumed that
respondent will wish to examine the claimant's e-mail or reports from the
claimant's detective in a close case.
The remainder of the jurisdictions presumably apply the traditional rule
that the cause of action accrues when the work is stolen. Many jurisdictions
have not ruled on this question recently, so one cannot be confident which
rule they would select.'"s
IV. Analysis of HEAR
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
1. Foreign Relations Power
The longest portion of the act consists of findings and purposes.89 The
eight findings and two purposes make it clear that the constitutional
underpinning of the act is the foreign relations power.190 The argument is
that the United States has entered into agreements with a number of foreign
181. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. A case where plaintiff had the benefit of the discovery rule but lost because he should have
discovered what he needed to know at an early time is Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 737 (9th
Cir. 2007) (applying California law).
185. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 338(c)(3) (West 2016).
186. Id.
187. Id. at (c)(3)(i) - (ii).
188. Recent examples include: Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 NWL 1016996,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2017); Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir.
2010) (applying Louisiana prescription law); Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F.Supp.2d
802, 806 - 807 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
189. HEAR, supra note, 1 at § 4(2).
190. See id.
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countries at the Washington and Terezin Conferences. Those agreements
are designed to assure that their legal systems facilitate just and fair solutions
to the problem of art stolen during the Holocaust based on the merits, and
to encourage alternative dispute r solution.191 While the declaration at
neither conference is binding on any of the signatories, it still constitutes a
statement of international principle. The only case to rule on the matter
held not only that statutes of limitation for the recovery of Holocaust Art
were within the foreign relations power as the resolution of war-related
disputes, but also that federal exercise of that power had pre-empted the
field so that states could not change their statutes of limitations.192 That
decision has been criticized,193 but it is both the controlling and the only
decision on the point. Whatever its merits, in the absence of federal action
on the point in controversy or where the United States has not given a
binding commitment on the point, the constitutionality of specific statutes
implementing treaty obligations such as HEAR is beyond doubt as part of
the foreign relations power'94 as long as they do not violate overriding
provisions of the constitution.
2. Commerce Clause
There is no mention in the legislation that HEAR might be grounded on
the commerce clause, which gives Congress power over interstate and
foreign commerce.195 The perception was probably that the foreign
relations power would cover all Holocaust art cases whereas the commerce
power would not cover cases where the art had never moved in international
or interstate commerce, as in Altmann or Chabad.196 The number of cases
not involving foreign or interstate commerce has thus far been quite small
and have involved government defendants. As most European museums are
either run by the government or an instrumentality of the government and
the scope of United States jurisdiction to adjudicate under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act is expansive;197 the potential for such cases is
large.198
191. S. REP. No. 114-394, at 6 (2016).
192. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
193. Rajika L. Shah, The Making of California's Art Recovery Statute: The Long Road to Section
338(c)(3), 20 CHAP. L. REv. 77, 92-95, 111-12 (2017); MichaelJ. Bazyler & Rajika L. Shah, The
Unfinished Business ofthe Armenian Genocide: Armenian Property Restitution in American Courts, 23
Sw. J. INT'L L. 223, 250-53 (2017); S. REP No. 114-394, 114th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (2016).
194. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
195. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
196. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 541 U.S. 677
(2004); see also Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation, 466 F.Supp.2d
6, 12 (D.D.C. 2006).
197. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 541 U.S. 677
(2004) (Defendant was engaged in a commercial activity in the United States by advertising its
tourism and publishing a book here.).
198. For example, after World War II, France identified roughly 2,000 paintings as deserving of
return because they were stolen during the war. France was unable to find the rightful owners.
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3. Equal Protection
The proponents might have feared that HEAR would be subject to
challenge under the equal protection clause. As indicated below, the act
does not apply to all stolen art. It applies to art stolen during the Holocaust,
by a limited group of people and institutions, and in pursuit of a particular
ideology. By detailing the history of the Holocaust, the statute and
committee report try to make the case that those occurrences are sufficiently
unique to merit being placed in a category of their own.
4. Takings Clause
Normally, a jurisdiction can either lengthen or shorten its statute of
limitation as it wishes without constitutional challenge.199
There are two exceptions. The legislature may not destroy a cause of
action before the holder has the opportunity to bring suit.200 That limit does
not apply to HEAR. The second exception is more germane to HEAR. The
Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of property without due process of
law.201 Property can be acquired by deed, bequest, intestate succession,
abandonment, or adverse possession. One acquires property by adverse
possession on the date that the statute of limitations expires. No document
or court action is necessary for the acquisition of title by adverse
possession.202 If, on the date of enactment of HEAR, the possessor's rights
in the artwork have ripened into title by the doctrine of adverse possession
or the analogous doctrine of prescription, the legislature cannot take that
property by lengthening the statute of limitations so as to permit the former
owner to recover it.203 Impairing a title acquired by adverse possession is no
different from impairing a tide acquired by deed, gift, or bequest.204 The
The paintings were loaned to museums throughout the country and designated as part of the
musee non recuperee (museum of non-restituted art). Later, their accession numbers were
changed, obscuring their history.
199. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1190 (1950).
200. Id. at 1190-1191.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202. As a practical matter, it is a good idea to secure a judgment in a quiet title action in order
to have evidence of title by adverse possession, but it is not necessary to give the adverse
possessor title.
203. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885) (dictum because the case involved a
contract obligation to pay a minor the proceeds from the sale of her land and rental of her
slaves); Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945) (dictum because case
permitted the extension of the statute of limitations to recover damages from a seller of
securities); Stewart v. Keys, 295 U.S. 403, 417 (1935) (alternate holding); Cassirer v. Thyssen-
Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F.Supp.3d 1148, 1167-1168 (C.D.Cal. 2015), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, No. 15-55550, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017); Cassirer v. Thyssen-
Bornemisza Collection Found., 737 F.3d 613, 619-620 (9th Cir. 2013) (dictum because
defendant had not proven that he had acquired title); Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, supra note 143.
204. It is fair to divide takings cases into three categories. One is where the property is actually
taken from the owner, usually (though not necessarily) for government use. This is what
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only cases to use HEAR did not consider the constitutional question because
that argument was not raised.205
B. SUNIARY OF WHAT HEAR DOES
For covered cases, HEAR provides an operative statute of limitations that
is six years after claimant actually discovers certain facts for the recovery of
certain cultural property stolen 1933-1945 as a result of Nazi persecution. It
does not repeal or pre-empt existing statutes of limitations.206 A claimant
can either take advantage of the existing state or federal statute of
limitations, or the limitations period provided by HEAR, whichever is
longer.207
C. SCOPE
HEAR applies only to a limited class of actions. It applies to actions to
recover property, but it does not apply to actions to recover damages for
being deprived of that property. In certain respects, it tracks California
law;208 often where it attempts to provide further definition, it provides less
clarity, not more. The California law is narrower in scope, as it applies only
to recovery of art from art professionals-museums, galleries, auctioneers,
or dealers.209 HEAR applies to all defendants, whether they be art
HEAR does if the current possessor has already acquired title. In the second category, the
property is not taken from the owner, but government regulation deprives the owner of its
economic utility. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The
third category is where the government regulates a business, but not a specific property. While
some judges prefer to analyze this as a substantive due process problem, others regard it as a
taking. The takings analysis asks whether the loss is substantial, whether reasonable investment
expectations are defeated (which is often the case where legislation is retroactive), and whether a
small number of people are singled out to bear the burdens of conduct long in the past. See
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 525-528, 532-537 (1998). If analyzed under these
criteria, the loss to the current possessor is total, that defeats his reasonable investment
expectations, and he is singled out to bear the cost of actions performed by others more than
seventy years ago.
205. Indeed, the briefs in one case had already been filed when HEAR was enacted. The
parties notified the court of it by letter. The court recognized the issue that the extension of the
California statute of limitation might violate the takings clause of the constitution, but did not
discusses whether HEAR did. The court did not discuss whether CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 338(c)(3) (West 2016) violated the takings clause because it thought that HEAR controlled the
case. See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum, 862 F.3d 951, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2017). In
De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1109-1110 (D.C.Cir. 2017), the Herzog
family asked that they be permitted to amend their complaint because "justice so requires." See
id.; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2). They cited HEAR as evidence of what justice required. The
court, in its two-paragraph discussion, did not interpret HEAR or discuss its constitutionality as
applied to this case.
206. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(2).
207. S. REP. No. 114-394, at 10 (2016).
208. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3) (West 2016).
209. Id. at (3)(A).
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20181 HOLOCAUST ART DISPUTES 233
professionals, major collectors, individuals owning but a single work of art,
or governments.210
1. "Artwork or Other Property"
The action must be to recover certain cultural property. The technical
term developed to define that property is "artwork or other property." That
term means pictures, paintings, drawings, statuary art, sculpture, engravings,
prints, lithographs, works of graphic art, applied art, original artistic
assemblages and montages, books, archives, musical objects and manuscripts
(including musical manuscripts and sheets), sound, photographic, and
cinematographic archives and mediums, sacred and ceremonial objects, and
Judaica.211 None of these terms is further defined either in the law or in the
legislative history.
The closest comparable term in federal law is the term "work of visual art"
that delimits the items protected by the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).212
That term is less extensive in many ways. It does not include musical objects
or manuscripts, archives, applied art, sacred and ceremonial objects, or
Judaica unless they can be categorized as sculpture, paintings, or prints.213
On prints and sculpture, VARA is limited to editions of 200 or fewer
exemplars, signed and numbered by the author,214 while HEAR applies
regardless of the number of works produced or whether they are signed or
numbered.
On the other hand, VARA seems more extensive in its clear application to
photographs.215 HEAR does not specifically mention photographs at all.
Photographs might be included as "pictures," though the use of that phrase
in connection with paintings and drawings would argue to the contrary.
Alternatively, it could be argued that photographs are included as "sound,
photographic, and cinematographic archives and mediums."216 It seems
incongruous to include a photographic archive, but to exclude individual
photographs or negatives that are not part of an archive. It may be that
photographs are intended to be included as "photographic . . . mediums,"
though that would be a strange way to express it; by contrast, VARA clearly
includes certain photographs (signed, numbered, and produced for
exhibition purposes), but includes no moving pictures.217
210. The California law would probably also apply to governments because in most cases the
reason the government has the art is because it is operating a museum.
211. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(2).
212. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. California law specifically includes photographs. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 982(d)(1) (West
2016).
216. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(2).
217. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016), supra note 212.
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"Artwork or other property" clearly includes collage as "original artistic
assemblages and montages," and probably includes environments, though
the number of those that were prepared before 1946 is probably small.218
The committee report discussion of the term "artwork or other property"
is short, not illuminating, and does not even consist of an entire paragraph.
It says: "The definition extends to include not only fine art, but applied art,
written texts, musical art, and Judaica."219
It is not at all clear what is meant by "applied art." Almost anything could
be applied art, as almost anything can be the subject of good (or bad) design.
One could suspect that by applied art, the statute means crafts, which is
specifically covered by California law.220 One could suspect that all "musical
objects," "sacred and ceremonial objects" and "Judaica" except manuscripts
and books would also be covered as "applied art." Even illuminated
manuscripts could be considered "applied art."
As a matter of practicality, the Act is only likely to be applied to work of
considerable value because of the cost of amassing the facts needed and the
cost of the lawyering required to bring suit. Because they often lack
significant value, many of the items listed above, though technically
qualifying under the act, are unlikely to be the subject of litigation by
themselves. They may be included with other items that the heirs of the
former owner seek from the person in possession if they have ended up in
the same hands as something truly valuable.
2. Covered Period
The period during which property must have been lost to get the benefit
of the act is January 1, 1933, to December 31, 1946.221 This period is
slightly longer than Nazi power, which began January 30, 1933, and ended
with V-E Day, May 8, 1945.222 The legislative history provides no clue as to
why the lengthier dates were chosen. While it can be argued that there was
considerable violence before the Nazi rise to power and much chaos after
the official end of the war, some of the other requirements of the act may be
difficult to establish, especially after May 8.
One might ask what needs to be proven to take advantage of the act with
respect to dates. To prove that one has lost property, one must first prove
that one had property. At this point, one need not prove how the property
departed.223 Likewise, one need not prove ownership on December 31,
1932. It is probably sufficient to prove ownership of the contested property
some reasonable time before that date, at which point the burden of proof
218. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(2).
219. S. REP. No. 114-394, at 9 (2016).
220. CAL. CIv. CODE § 982(d)(1) (2016).
221. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(2).
222. See VE Day, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/ve-day (last accessed Jan. 21,
2018).
223. In many cases, the substantive question will be whether the work was stolen, or whether
the work was abandoned, gifted, willed, or sold.
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might shift to the current possessor to prove that the purported owner sold,
gifted, bequeathed, or abandoned the property before 1933. An owner may
have acquired the property after 1932, but before 1946, in which case the
claiming owner must prove the acquisition of the property. As to proving
that he lost the property before 1946, it is probable that a claiming owner
meets his burden of proof by alleging and proving that he lost the property
before January 1, 1946, thereby shifting the burden to the current possessor
to prove that the owner still had the work on that date or at a later time.
3. Nazi Persecution
The act only applies to property lost as a result of Nazi persecution.224
"Nazi persecution" is defined as "any persecution of a specific group of
individuals based on Nazi ideology by the Government of Germany, its
allies or agents, members of the Nazi Party, or their agents or associates
"225
It does not apply to art initially lost to troops of the Soviet Union in their
reconquest of territory held by Germany during the war. It would, however,
apply to art first lost to Germany by the owner, but then taken by the Soviet
Union. The key determinants here are the person taking the work and the
reason for which it was taken. The identity of subsequent possessors of the
work is irrelevant.
The Act only applies to some art taken during the Nazi period. It requires
a persecution of a specific group of individuals. Courts can probably take
judicial notice that there were laws, doctrines, and customs of the German
government and its allies, the Nazi party, and related parties throughout
Europe, discriminating against certain groups. Those groups included Jews,
Gypsies, homosexuals, Slavs, and the disabled. The persecutions imposed
on each group were not identical, nor were they uniformly applied.
Other people lost art during the war who were not part of those groups.
Opponents of the Nazi regime were not treated kindly, yet it is hard to see
them as a "group" in the sense of the statute, or as being persecuted as a
result of an ideology. Artists who were out of favor might lose their
works.226
HEAR requires that the work be lost as a result of Nazi persecution of a
group.227 In many cases that will be easy because patterns of persecution
emerged, such as the aryanization of businesses. However, in some cases,
proving that the work was lost because of persecution may be more difficult.
Laws applying throughout a geographic area taking art without regard to
the identity of the person who suffers from them would not seem to result
224. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(5).
225. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(4).
226. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F.Supp.2d 473, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) contends
that though Grosz did not belong to any of the groups mentioned, he fled Germany for his
safety, necessarily leaving his art with someone else, and was declared stateless.
227. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(5).
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from a persecution of a specific group of individuals. Thus, the act would
not apply prima facie to the taking of so-called "degenerate art," which was
taken from all Germans, even German state museums.228 Artists who
produced degenerate art were subject to special persecution such as being
dismissed from university positions.229 Some were prohibited from creating
art. It is not clear that this was persecution of a group in the sense of the
statute, or persecution of individuals. Even if they do constitute a group,
works were not taken from them because they were a specific group of
individuals, but because all degenerate art was confiscated by the law.
A person could, however, argue that although the law was
nondiscriminatory, its application was discriminatory. What evidence needs
to be introduced to establish the discriminatory application of that law is
unclear. Probably the fact that none of Joseph Goebbels'230 collection of
degenerate art was confiscated is not enough. On the other hand, German
bureaucrats are prodigious record-keepers. There may be sufficient
evidence of the identities of the persons from whom degenerate art was
confiscated to clearly establish discriminatory enforcement of the law against
persons with certain characteristics.
The law also requires persecution by certain individuals or entities.
Entities are the government of Germany, the government of its allies, or the
agents of either.231 This includes the Vichy government in France and the
Mussolini government in Italy. Both were formal German allies. Whether
HEAR would apply to work stolen by the Soviet Union 1939-1941 is
doubtful, as the German-Russian agreement was one of non-aggression.232
Likewise, though the Spanish government had clear affinities for the Nazis,
its position during the war was one of formal neutrality.
Individuals include members of the Nazi party, their agents, or their
associates. Thus, if the allegation were that the owner was coerced to sell his
art gallery by a member of the Nazi party for a ridiculously low price to a
person who was not a member of the Nazi party but who was designated by
the Nazi party member, the "buyer" would be an associate, and the Act
228. GESETZ UBER DIE EINZIEHUNG VON ERZEUGNISSEN ENTARTETER KuNST [LAW ON
CONFISCATION OF WORKS OF DEGENERATE ART], May 31, 1938 (Ger.), available at http://
litgloss.buffalo.edu/gesetz/test.shtml. The 1937 exhibition of degenerate art included 650
works confiscated from thirty-two German museums, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/
sub-document.cfm?document id=1578, last accessed 25 April 2017. See Michael Rebholz,
Recovery of Nazi-Related Art: Legal Aspects Under German and U.S. Law Exemplified by the Gurlitt
Case, 37 Comm/ENT 305, 311 (2015).
229. WILLIAM S. BRADLEY, EMIL NOLDE AND GERMAN EXPRESSIONISM: A PROPHET IN HIS
OwN LAND, 115 (1986).
230. Paul Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) was Reich Minister of Propaganda 1933-1945.
231. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4(5).
232. It probably looked to the Poles as though the two countries were allies. Germany invaded
Poland from the west September 1, while the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east
sixteen days later. The agreement is variously known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the
Nazi-Soviet Pact. Its official name is the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
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would apply.233 On the other hand, if an owner claimed that he sold his art
at a bargain price to his neighbor, who was not a Nazi party member or a
government official, because the neighbor threatened to report him to the
Gestapo, the Act does not apply because the neighbor was not an agent of
either the government or of a member of the Nazi party. Thus, HEAR has
no application to work stolen by American servicemen at the end of the
war.
2 34
D. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN HEAR APPLIES
1. Recovery of Property Only
Provided that the facts meet the criteria set forth above, HEAR provides
that the statute of limitations for the recovery of property will be either the
statute of limitations otherwise prescribed, or six years from the time of
actual knowledge of specified facts, whichever is longer.235 The extension of
the statute of limitations only applies to actions that would at common law
have been deemed actions of replevin. HEAR makes no change in the
statute of limitations for the recovery of damages.
This is a little strange. In most cases, one cannot recover damages if one
has obtained title by adverse possession.236 The theory is that the adverse
possessor always was the owner. It would be inconsistent with that theory to
award the property to the adverse possessor but to give damages to the
original owner. This is the opposite case. There would seem to be no
reason why a person who can recover property should not also be able to
recover damages for being deprived of that property, except that HEAR
clearly does not extend the statute of limitations to recover damages.237
233. However, the beneficiaries of those agreements were normally Nazi party members. See,
e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
234. See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
235. S. REP. No. 114-394, at 10 (2016).
236. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 224 cmt. (c) (Am. LAW. INST. 1936); ibid., § 465;
Nagel v. Emmons Cty. Water Res. Dist., 474 N.W.2d 46, 50 (N.D. 1991).
237. Take a hypothetical case in New York. The statute of limitations for the recovery of
property, or for the recovery of damages for property taken, is three years. N.Y. C. P. L. R.
§ 214 T 3 (McKinney). Owner demands the return of his property December 31, 2011, and the
possessor immediately refuses to return the property. The owner does not sue until 2015. The
suit is barred for both recovery of the property and for damages. HEAR revives the statute of
limitations for recovery of the property, but not for damages. Note that since New York is a
demand-and-refusal state because of Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874), the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the owner makes a demand, and that demand is refused.
In the above case, if the possessor did not refuse to return the property, but a long negotiation
ensued about the return so that the refusal does not take place until December 31, 2015, the
original owner should, in my opinion, be able to file suit through the end of 2018. HEAR does
not extend the statute; the period allowed by the New York statute because of the demand-and-
refusal rule would be longer than the period provided by HEAR, six years of actual knowledge.
A related argument failed in Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F.Supp.2d 473 (2010), affd
2010 U.S. App Lexis 25659, the court suggesting that lengthy continued negotiations with
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In most cases, this will not be significant. Damages will be trivial
compared to the value of the property recovered. However, every bit of
damages makes a difference. An owner might be able to prove that he could
have rented the artwork during the period and gained substantial income.
In addition, the value of property is not stable. A person might recover
property that had great value three years before, but for which the market
has collapsed. One might argue for damages equal to the difference in fair
market value between the high point and the date of judgment.
HEAR makes no change in the statute of limitations for civil forfeiture.
One method by which the original owner's heirs can get their property is to
induce the federal government to seek civil forfeiture. While technically the
property is forfeited to the United States, the custom of the United States
government is to grant the property to its rightful owner. Civil forfeiture
has been sought under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)238 when
stolen property has been brought into the United States,239 or under customs
laws when an importer has made a material misstatement on importing an
item. The reason HEAR does not apply to civil forfeiture lies in the
wording of HEAR: "a civil claim or cause of action . . . to recover any
artwork or other property . . . " (emphasis added).240 With civil forfeiture,
the government is not recovering property because it never owned the
property in the first place. It is forfeiting the property.
The fact that HEAR does not extend the NSPA five-year statute of
limitations is not very significant because NSPA only applies when the
person transmits tolen property "knowing the same to have been stolen."241
Most possessors of art stolen during the Holocaust have no idea that they
possess stolen property. Likewise, typical customs violations require
knowing misrepresentations that are material to importation before a work
can be forfeited.242 The technical term is "without reasonable cause to
believe the truth of such statement . . ."243
proposals for joint ownership and to hire an independent investigator amounted to a refusal
because they did not acknowledge plaintiffs ownership.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2016); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2016); 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a)(c)(1) (2016)
provide for forfeiture. It has also been argued that 22 U.S.C. § 401 (2016) might be construed
to provide for forfeiture of artwork. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6445 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
239. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(United States sued to forfeit a Schiele painting loaned by the Austrian Leopold gallery for
display at the Museum of Modern Art because it had been stolen from Leah Bondi Jaray during
the Holocaust and the gallery director knew it.). For discussion of whether Bondi surname in
Prague is of Ashkenazic or Sephardi origin, see Alexander Beider, Exceptional Ashkenazic
Surnames of Sephardic Origin, 33 AVOTAYNU 3,5 (#4, Winter 2017).
240. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 5(a).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2016).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2016).
243. 18 U.S.C. § 542 (2016). See also United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d
131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) for an art forfeiture as a result of intentionally mis-stating the country
of origin and certifying a worth at only twenty-five percent of fair market value.
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018] HOLOCAUST ART DISPUTES 239
HEAR does not make every suit to recover Holocaust art into a suit that
can be heard in federal court under federal question jurisdiction.244 It
specifically states that it is not creating "a civil claim or cause of action."245
While sometimes federal question jurisdiction can be based on a state cause
of action,246 it must be a case where the federal question is necessarily raised,
actually disputed, substantial, and can be resolved in federal court without
disrupting federal-state balance. "Substantial" seems to mean important to
the federal system as a whole.247 It is doubtful that any interpretation of
HEAR would rise to that status. Still, most cases will be in federal court
because of diversity of citizenship.
2. Laches Preserved
As originally drafted, HEAR would have abolished the defense of laches.
Congress thought better of this. The law states, "Notwithstanding . . . any
defense at law relating to the passage of time . . ." making it clear that laches
is not affected by the law because it was a defense at equity, not at law.248
The legislative history confirms this interpretation.249
3. Extend the Statute of Limitations How Far?
It further provides that the six-year period begins on the date of
enactment of HEAR even if the claimant had knowledge of the requisite
facts before the date of enactment, whether or not the claim would be barred
by another statute of limitations.250 Reading this provision, one might think
that no claim would be barred before the end of 2022, six years after
enactment. That is mostly, but not entirely, true.
Subsection (e) provides that HEAR will not apply if the claimant had
actual knowledge on or after January 1, 1999 and not less than six years had
passed from the date of such knowledge during which the claim was not
barred by a statute of limitations.251 To illustrate, in case 1, claimant
discovers the facts he needs January 1, 2014. Claimant is not barred because
six years have not passed. In case 2, claimant discovers the facts needed
244. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2016).
245. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 5(a). Most Holocaust recovery cases are brought in federal courts
under diversity jurisdiction because the claimants are often not citizens of the United States and
the current possessors are citizens or corporations of the United States.
246. Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Dame Eng'g, 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (federal
jurisdiction proper in a state law quiet title action where the crucial question was the
interpretation of a federal Internal Revenue Service notice provision.).
247. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 260 (2013) (Plaintiffs contention in a state malpractice
case that his lawyer should have raised a federal patent issue was important to his case, but not
to the federal patent system as a whole.).
248. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 5(a).
249. "The amendment removes the reference precluding the availability of equitable defenses
and the doctrine of laches." See S. REP. No. 114-394, at 7 (2016).
250. Id. at 10.
251. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 5(e).
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January 1, 2011. Claimant's action may or may not be barred; it depends on
the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. If the statute of limitations is
six years or longer and there is a jurisdiction in which defendant was
amenable to suit that is a traditional jurisdiction, a discovery rule
jurisdiction, or an actual discovery jurisdiction, claimant is barred on January
1, 2017 because six years have passed during which he could have brought
suit. If the statute of limitations is three years, claimant is not barred until
January 1, 2020. His action was not barred from 2011 to 2014, three years,
but it was barred from 2014 to 2017 because of the three-year statute.
HEAR revives the potential to sue in 2017, and the additional three years
until 2020 assures that claimant has had six years in which to sue. There is
no indication that the six years must be consecutive, though one could
certainly argue that it should be because the apparent expiration of the
statute of limitations might have diverted the claimant's attention from his
claim. The better rule, and the one that more conforms to the statutory
language, is that six years of knowledge is sufficient to bring action, whether
consecutive or not.
What about a situation where the owner's claim has been litigated to final
judgment and the period for appeal has expired? The wording of the statute
makes it appear that such a claim might not be barred by the statute of
limitations and could be re-raised, but the Senate report makes it clear that
HEAR does not benefit those claims.252 But, a claim where a case has been
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds but the period for appeal has yet
to expire can benefit from the extra time allowed by HEAR.253
4. Knowledge of What?
The two things of which claimant must have knowledge in order to start
the HEAR six-year period are (1) the identity and location of the work; and
(2) the claimed possessory interest of the claimant.
Before discussion of either, one must know who the claimant might be
under HEAR. The factual answer is that both the representative of the
original owner and the current possessor are claimants. The original
owner's representative is claiming the property based on ancestral
ownership. The current possessor is claiming the property based on
ownership of his grantor or his own ownership, either as the grantee of the
true owner, as a good faith purchaser or as an adverse possessor. It is clear
from the context of the statute that the claimant is meant to be the original
252. The textual support for this statement lies in § 5(d), which provides that HEAR applies to
pending causes, and to cases filed between the effective date of HEAR and December 31, 2026.
This is a negative pregnant that implies that HEAR does not apply to cases that have been
finally decided. S. REP. 114-394, 114th Cong. 2d Sess. 10 (2016) states: "Claims that were
dismissed pursuant to, or litigated to, a final judgment from which no appeal lies on the date of
enactment are unaffected by this provision."
253. Both propositions are true in California. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338(c)(3)(B)
(2016).
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owner's representative because he is the one claiming to move the art from
its current possessor.
Knowing the claimed possessory interest of the claimant requires two
important items: (1) the claimant must know that the original owner was in
fact the owner of the work when it was lost 1933-1945; and (2) the claimant
must also know that she is the heir entitled to sue on behalf of that original
owner.
Under the circumstances, these are not trivial matters. It is not at all clear
that everyone who is the heir of someone who owned work lost in the
Holocaust will know that he is the heir. Because the end of the covered
period was more than seventy years ago, someone who was adult enough to
own the work then would now be north of ninety years old.254 The number
of owners who currently survive must surely be small.255 It will, therefore,
be an heir who is entitled to sue. A goodly number of people who owned
significant art collections had no children.256 Their heirs are likely to be
collateral relatives. But which one? In the chaos and dislocation following
World War II, families were often separated and did not know what relatives
survived. Charitable organizations attempted to reunite families with some
success,257 but even seventy years after the war ended, people were re-
connected with cousins they thought had perished during the war.2 5 8 So, it is
entirely possible that a distant relative of a person might know that she was a
distant relative, but might not know that she was the heir.
Likewise, the current living heir may not know what covered works her
ancestor owned. Many persecuted individuals were lucky to escape with
their lives. If they had ownership records, most were lost or destroyed
during the war. The same is true of photographs of works. If the heir is a
great nephew or a great-greatgrandchild born after the war, or even born in
the late 1930s, he may have no knowledge of the art owned by his ancestor
1933-1945. For the reasons indicated above, situations where records were
most likely to have survived are art owned by dealers or by major, meticulous
collectors.
The claimant must also have actual knowledge of the identity and location
of the artwork.259 But there is a special rule for misidentification in the case
of multiples. If the work is "one of a group of substantially similar multiple
artworks or other property," actual discovery occurs on the date on which
254. This would not be true if the work was owned by a minor. No such situation has surfaced
in litigation, but it is certainly possible. Even so, the minor would now be at least in his 70s.
255. In the actual litigated cases, none of the claimants were the person from whom the art was
taken except Mrs. Menzel, whose case was litigated in the early 1960s.
256. Maria Altmann was the niece of Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, who had no children. See Elana
Shapira, Adele Bloch-Bauer, JEWISH WOMEN's ARCHIVE, https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/
bloch-bauer-adele (last accessed Apr. 27, 2017).
257. The principal one, which also had government support, was the International Tracing
Service in Bad Arsolen Germany, https://www.its-arolsen.org/en/, last accessed Apr. 27, 2017.
258. See, e.g., David Price, Reunion After 70 Years, 32 AVOTAYNU 68 (#4, Winter 2016).
259. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4.
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there are facts sufficient to form a substantial basis to believe that this one is
the one that was lost.260 Whether the work was the one lost or not.
In the art world, a "multiple" is a print or sculpture of which there are
numerous more-or-less identical copies.261 Even though painters often do
similar paintings of the same subject (see my discussion above of Bernardo
Strozzi's St. Catherine of Alexandria), these works are not considered
multiples. Whether they were intended to be included in the statute is
anyone's guess, but the use of the term "multiples" argues against it. That is
to the relief of the original owner's heirs, because the statute shortens the
statute of limitations for such multiples to the discovery of the location of
the first of these similar multiples that seem to have belonged to his
ancestor.262 It is unlikely that the heir will know the number of the print his
ancestor had, so the fact that it is a print of the same image should be
enough to "form a substantial basis to believe" that it is the lost work.263
The result is that if the claimant discovers a Rembrandt etching that is the
same image as one his ancestor lost in the possession of X Museum, but it
later turns out that X Museum has a clear title, the statute of limitations has
begun to run on a suit to recover the copy actually taken. No reason for this
is provided in the legislative history-just a description of the provision, and
it is hard to see why the owner's heir's statute of limitations should begin to
run when he cannot institute suit for the real thing. This provision
contradicts the spirit of "actual discovery."
What is "actual discovery?" It is first defined as "knowledge," but when
"knowledge" is defined, we are not so sure. The definition states that it
means "having actual knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient
information with regard to a relevant fact or circumstance to amount to
actual knowledge thereof."264 It is clear that something less than actual
knowledge is meant; it is unclear what having sufficient information with
regard to a relevant fact or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge
might be. It does not appear that the statute means to include constructive
notice that one gets from the fact that a document is recorded in a certain
place.265 If it means inquiry notice,266 this is certainly an obscure way of
260. Id. at § 5(b).
261. More or less identical because each copy made from the original will have slight variations,
if only because the plate or the mold from which it is made is more worn. With prints, the ink
distribution or the wiping may not be exactly replicated.
262. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 5(b).
263. See id.
264. HEAR, supra note 1, at §§ 4(1), (4).
265. One is said to have constructive notice of the contents of deeds recorded in one's chain of
title. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 882,
886-889 (3d ed. 2000). The California statute's expansion on actual knowledge simply excludes
"constructive knowledge imputed by law." See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 338(c)(3)(C)(1) (2016).
But, in California, constructive notice includes both what would be discovered from an
examination of the records, and what is usually called inquiry notice: the duty to make further
inquiry about the legal status of things that do not comport with the record, such as possession
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stating it. Yet, the addition of this phrase to the statute must mean
something, but its enactment only confuses the definition.267
Actual knowledge is extremely difficult to prove. We cannot know what is
in the mind of another person. We can only deduce actual knowledge based
on another person's acts and statements. Clearly, making a demand for the
return of the work would be an act from which one could deduce that the
demander knew the identity and location of the work, as well as the person
claiming a possessory interest. In copyright law, we deduce that a person
knew that the work was copyrighted if we find a copy of the work with a
copyright notice in his possession, or if the person hands a picture of the
work that contained a copyright notice to another person, having admitted
that he tore off the copyright notice.268 Along the same lines, access to a
copyrighted work can be proven by establishing that the work has been
widely disseminated, so that it is readily accessible.269 One wonders whether
the continuous exhibition of the work in a museum for a long period of time
would be enough to establish a prima facie case of actual knowledge.270
5. Changing the Time Required for Acquisitive Prescription
HEAR does not lengthen the time or change any other requirements for
acquisitive prescription in civil law jurisdictions.271 While the decision has
been criticized,272 it is correct. Almost since the beginning of the republic,
the "Charming Betsy" principle of statutory construction has been to
construe statutes whenever possible so that they do not contravene
international law.273 While the international law principle was stronger in
1800 than it is today, it is still a principle that one country's law should not
prescribe conduct in another's territory unless certain conditions are met
which do not seem to apply here.274
of the property by a person not the title holder, mention in a deed of an unrecorded interest, or
construction according to a uniform scheme.
266. One has inquiry notice of the rights of some possessors, a quitclaim deed in one's chain of
title, or the apparent uniformity of buildings within a subdivision. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN,
supra note 265, at 882-886.
267. The comparable California provision is clear: constructive notice is not actual discovery.
See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 338(c)(3)(C)(1) (2016).
268. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
269. 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 9.2.1.1 (3d ed. 2014).
270. In a somewhat analogous case, it was held that deposit of a copy in the Library of Congress
was insufficient to prove wide dissemination. Higgins v. Woroner Prods., Inc., 1969 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9801, at *1-*2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 1969).
271. Cassirer v. Thyssem-Bornemisa Collection Foundation, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
272. Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2017, to be published in
66 Am. J. Comp. L. (2018), htpps://ssrn.com/abstract=3093709, at pp. 60-62.
273. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
274. The topic is discussed at length at Restatement (Fourth) The Foreign Relations Law of
the United States Jurisdiction § 203 (Am. Law Inst.) (T.D. No. 3, 2017). While the black letter
does not make this distinction, comment a limits the presumption to substantive provisions.
Comments b and c state that the presumption against extraterritoriality can be rebutted either
by express language or by the focus of the provision. The Reporters' Notes cite many cases
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A second principle of statutory interpretation is that where there are two
possible interpretations, one of which would raise serious constitutional
questions and the other of which would not, the interpretation that does not
raise constitutional questions is to be preferred.275 In this case, if HEAR
were interpreted to alter the requirements for acquisitive prescription that
was otherwise achieved in 1999, this would raise the question of HEAR's
constitutionality as applied to this case under the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment discussed above.276
Moving to the substantive question, HEAR applies "[n]otwithstanding...
any defense at law relating to the passage of time." Defenses at law were
defenses developed in the law courts; they are contrasted with defenses at
equity, such as laches, clean hands, and balancing of the hardships, that were
developed in the equity courts of England.277 Acquisitive prescription is not
a common law doctrine at all. It was developed in civil law countries whose
law follows the model of Roman law. History would not tell us whether it is
a doctrine of law or equity. We would need to operate by analogy.
Is it a defense "relating to the passage of time?" Certainly. The passage of
time is one of the requirements for acquisitive prescription, in this case six
years. Unlike typical statutes of limitation, more is required for acquisitive
prescription than simply the passage of time.278 In the case of the Spanish
acquisitive prescription in Cassirer, the possession must be public and the
possessor may not be the thief, his accomplice, or an accessory. Accessory
has been variously defined as either someone who acted to aid the person
who committed the crime in avoiding penalties, or simply as someone who
knew about the crime.279 Whichever definition is used, those requirements
are different in kind from the requirements attached to the expiration of the
statute of limitations, and their evocation of good faith is certainly more
analogous to English concepts of equity than of law.
A similar result should be expected where the law of a foreign country
provides that a good faith purchaser of art in the ordinary course of the
seller's business acquires good title after possessing the art for a specified
number of years.280"
both applying the principle and failing to apply it, as well as some in which Congress later
overruled the application of the presumption.
275. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis concurrance).
276. See supra note 199.
277. See supra note 199.
278. Note that this is also true in a sense of the statute of limitations if you collapse the rules
about tolling into the statute. What is required is passage of time while defendant is present in
the jurisdiction and is not fraudulently concealing the work being sought.
279. Cassirer v. Thyssem-Bornemisa Collection Foundation, 862 F.3d 951, 965-973 (9th Cir.
2017).
280. See supra note 161.
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6. Examples
The following sections illustrate the likely effect of HEAR in selected
jurisdiction types.
a. New York's Demand-and-Refusal, Three-Year Statute
New York is the most important jurisdiction for the return of Holocaust
art. It has a large number of museums and private collectors. It is also the
state in the United States in which the most important art auctions are held.
If a valuable piece is sent to auction in the United States either from within
or from outside the United States, it will likely be sent to New York.281
HEAR is likely to have least effect in New York. That is because New
York uses the demand-and-refusal rule for the accrual of a cause of action.
This means that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
comparatively late. The fact that a person has made a demand for the return
of his property is excellent evidence that the person had actual knowledge
that he was entitled to claim the property and that he knew the location of
the property. For that reason, in New York, the only likely result of HEAR
is to extend the statute of limitations from three years after demand is
refused to six years after actual discovery if that is a longer period. As suit is
likely to follow soon after a refusal to deliver, the extension is unlikely to be
used frequently.
Because suit is unlikely to be delayed much beyond refusal of a demand, it
is unlikely that anyone would have gained title by adverse possession before
December 16, 2016, (the effective date of HEAR) under New York's
demand-and-refusal rule. For that reason, the vice that HEAR might
unconstitutionally take a property interest will not normally be a concern in
New York.
b. New Jersey Discovery Rule, Six-Year Statute282
Assessing the impact of HEAR in New Jersey is complicated by the fact
that it is uncertain whether adverse possession of personalty is still possible
there. While the court in O'Keeffe v. Snyder283 talks about abolishing adverse
possession for chattels,284 it concludes that a possessor who prevails under
the discovery rule obtains good title.285 Thus, one must consider two
alternatives. One is that New Jersey actually permits adverse possession or
something close enough to it to be considered functional adverse possession.
The second is that adverse possession of personal property does not exist in
New Jersey.
281. A count of litigated cases confirms this. Nine cases of Holocaust art were litigated in New
York; four in California; no other state had more than one. If all cases litigated to judgment
seeking the return of stolen art (not limited to Holocaust art) were counted, the results would
be more lopsided in favor of New York as a litigating location.
282. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1963).
283. O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 885 (1980).
284. See id. at 872.
285. See id. at 874.
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If there is no adverse possession of chattels in New Jersey, there can be no
concern that HEAR would unconstitutionally take property when it
lengthens the statute of limitations.
That would leave two possibilities. If claimant does not establish that he
was sufficiently diligent to benefit from the discovery rule, the cause of
action would accrue when the work was stolen and brought into New
Jersey.286 HEAR would postpone that accrual until the claimant actually
knew what he needed to know to sue.2 8 7 The six years provided by New
Jersey law and the six years provided by HEAR would be the same, but the
later accrual would be significant in many cases.
If claimant establishes that he was sufficiently diligent to use the discovery
rule, HEAR is still likely to extend the statute of limitations unless the time
when claimant actually discovers what he needs to know is the same moment
that he should have discovered it. In that limited case, the time provided by
HEAR and New Jersey law would be the same. If the facts are actually
discovered later than they should have been discovered, HEAR will provide
the same amount of extra time to bring suit.
If, on the other hand, New Jersey has something like adverse possession
for chattels, any possession that ripened into title before December 16, 2016,
will be protected from HEAR by the takings clause of the constitution. But,
such a result has its own set of problems. It is unlikely that it can be
determined whether adverse possession has occurred without significant
discovery and a trial on that issue. This is because those questions call for
judgments about reasonability of diligence and what one should have
learned, which usually cannot be resolved without a trial.
For current possessors whose possession did not ripen into title by adverse
possession, the result will be as set forth above if New Jersey has abolished
adverse possession for personalty.
c. California Actual Discovery Rule & Six-Year Statute for Art
Professionals, Discovery Rule, and Three-Year Statute for
Other Current Possessors
The effect of HEAR in California is a bit complicated because California
has a number of different statutes of limitations for the recovery of personal
property, two of which apply to the property protected by HEAR.288 An
action to recover property of historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic
significance taken by theft invokes the discovery rule, requiring suit within
three years of the time the diligent owner discovered or should have
discovered what he needs to know.289 But, a suit brought before December
286. The universal rule is that the statute of limitations does not run when the work is outside
the jurisdiction or when the work is being fraudulently concealed.
287. HEAR, supra note 1, at § 4.
288. The general rule is three years from the time the cause of action accrues, presumably the
time of the taking. See CA. CODE Crv. PROC. § 338(c)(1) (2016).
289. See CA. CODE CIv. PROC. § 338(c)(2) (2016). This provision was enacted by Stats. 1982,
c. 340, p. 1642 § 3.
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31, 2017, to recover from an art world professional a work taken within one
hundred years of the enactment provides that the three year period begins
from actual discovery.290
If the applicable statute of limitations had already expired before HEAR
was enacted, so that the current possessor became the owner by adverse
possession, HEAR could not constitutionally be applied because that would
be an unconstitutional taking. The comments about the extra cost of
discovery and proof with the New Jersey discovery law apply here. If the
applicable statute of limitations has not yet given the current possessor title,
then HEAR would extend the statute to six years after actual discovery.
d. Traditional Jurisdictions
Traditional jurisdictions, where the cause of action accrues as soon as the
property is stolen (as long as the property is located within the jurisdiction
and is not fraudulently concealed291) are jurisdictions where the current
possessor is most likely to have gained title by adverse possession. In that
case, the current possessor would be constitutionally protected from HEAR
by the takings clause.
But, where the current possessor has not gained title, those jurisdictions
will have the statute of limitations extended to the full six years after actual
knowledge by HEAR.
V. Implications for Practice
HEAR clearly tilts the scales toward the original owner's heirs having a
chance at discovery and the opportunity to go to trial to try to recover the
property.
A. LITIGATE ABROAD
The initial response of the current possessor may be to litigate the
question of ownership outside the United States.292 Such a move has the
advantage of making it less likely that HEAR will be applied as the choice of
law for the statute of limitations. If the substance of the controversy is ever
reached, it is more likely that the substantive choice of law will point to the
law of some European civil law country that will protect a good faith
290. Id. at § 338(c)(3). This part of the statute was enacted in 2010, so it includes works
illegally taken in the Armenian genocide or the Russian revolution, as well as works stolen
domestically.
291. There is a presumption that possession by the thief or by someone who knows about the
theft is fraudulent concealment. BROWN & RAUSHENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 4.2 (3d ed. 1975).
292. Some cases where the current possessor instituted the lawsuit are reviewed at Simon J.
Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums Initiation of Declaratory Judgment Actions and Assertion of
Statutes of Limitations in Response to Nazi-Era Art Restitution Claims-A Defense, 23 DEPAUL J.
ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 308-323 (2013) and NICHOLAS M. O'DONNELL, A
TRAGIC FATE 102-121, 146-186, 203-215 (2017).
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purchaser. One way to do this would be to bring a declaratory judgment
action293 to determine title outside the United States. It would probably
help to move the work to the country in which the litigation is to take place,
if it is not already located there. A fringe benefit is that the heirs of the
original owner will need to pay their lawyer, as contingent fees are not
common (and may not be permitted) in civil law countries.
Such an approach may not be feasible for several reasons. It may not be
possible to get jurisdiction over the person claiming to be the heir of the
original owner in the foreign court. Jurisdiction based on the temporary
presence of the artwork may not be authorized.294 Second, one must
consider that moving valuable artwork is expensive. Even more expensive, in
many civil law countries, the filing fees are determined as a percentage of
what is claimed, so the filing fee may be prohibitive.295 In addition, the
foreign court may require that a bond be posted to cover court costs and
attorneys fees, because in most countries the loser pays his own attorneys
fees and those of the winner.296 Discovery is usually much more limited in
foreign forums than in the United States. One must consider that the
owner's heir may file suit in the United States, resulting in all the costs and
complications of trying to pursue two parallel litigations. Even if you win,
one must assess whether the foreign judgment is likely to be recognized and
enforced in the United States. A final risk is that many civil law countries
prohibit the export of a work that the country considers to be a national
treasure, even though it has only been brought into the country
temporarily.297 The art in that case could not be returned to the United
293. In Bakalar v. Vavra, 550 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.
2010), argued, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 500 F. App'x 6 (2d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam), the current possessor was first to the courthouse, but filed suit in New York. In
Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008), the art was moved abroad and suit
instituted there. The author is unaware of the final outcome in that case, but has been told that
the foreign suit was not seriously pursued.
294. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L. 351), regulates where a person domiciled in a member
state may be sued. Article 7(4) provides that a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued
in another Member State "as regards a civil claim for the recovery, based on ownership, of a
cultural object . . . initiated by the person claiming the right to recover such an object, in the
courts for the place where the cultural object is situated at the time when the court is seised;" Id.
art. 7(4). This is the reverse of the case posited in the text, Bakalar, 550 F. Supp. 2d 549, where
it is the current possessor, rather than the claimant, who wishes to sue. If the defendant is not
domiciled in a member state, the regulation article 6(1) leaves the question of jurisdiction to the
law of the state where the suit is filed. 2012 O.J. (L. 351), art. 6(1).
295. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 2009-10 (C.D. Cal. 2001), affd
317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), affd 541 U.S. 677 (2004), where the Austrian filing fee was at
least $130,000.
296. See id. at 1210.
297. See, e.g., Timothy P. Ramier, Agent Judiciaire du Trisor v. Walter: Fait du Prince and a King's
Ransom, 6 NT'L J. CULT. PROP. 337 (1997); Alan Riding, A Van Gogh Becomes a Cause Cilbre,
N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/18/arts/a-van-gogh-becomes-a-
cause-celebre.html?pagewanted=all (discussing Agent Judiciaire du Tresor c. Walter, Cass. Civ.
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States, regardless of whether the foreign court favors the original owner's
heir or the current possessor.298
Not all current possessors will choose to litigate abroad, even if they can.
Because a major share of the revenue of most American museums comes
from fundraising, museums must always be conscious of their public images.
Moving art out of the country and litigating abroad are not likely to be
public relations successes for museums. As a result, it can be predicted that
current possessors who try to litigate abroad will be either individual
collectors or dealers, foreign governments, or foreign museums. They are
unlikely to be American museums.
B. EQUITABLE DEFENSES, PRINCIPALLY LACHES
Removing the availability of the statute of limitations defense puts
enormous pressure on equitable defenses, primarily the doctrine of laches.
Laches will bar the institution of suit if the claimant or his ancestor
unreasonably delayed filing suit, with the result that the current possessor
suffered a significant detriment. A significant difference between the statute
of limitations defense and laches is that a statute of limitations defense will
normally succeed at the pleadings stage if it has merit, thereby sparing the
parties considerable legal expense. Because laches considers all the facts and
circumstances, discovery and a mini-trial are required before a decision can
be made about whether laches will bar the suit.299
Ire, 20 fev. 1996, Bull. de la Cour, where Jacques Walter, a French citizen, bought a Van Gogh
in New York in 1955, brought it to France in 1957, and was denied permission to take it to his
Geneva home in 1989, as France in that year classified it as a national treasure). He recovered a
substantial judgment, in part because of procedural irregularities, because confining the
painting to France reduced its value by roughly eighty-five percent. See id. Such action is
authorized by the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 4(a), Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
231, as property created within French territory by a French resident. Article 4(b) seems to
justify such classification even when the only reason is that the artwork was once in the country.
See id. art. 4(b). Italy claimed a Matisse painted in France as its national treasure because it was
owned by an Italian in Milan in Jeanneret v. Vichey, 693 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
298. See id.
299. Summary judgment on laches denied: Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,
762 F. Supp. 44, 47 (1990); Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). Summary judgment on laches granted: In re Peters, 34 A.D.3d 29, 30 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2006); Wertheimer v. Cirker's Hayes Stor. Warehouse, 300 A.D.2d 117, 118, (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002). Judge Rakoff comments in Schoeps: "[T]he fact-intensive question of whether
laches bars Claimants' action will be the subject of an evidentiary hearing conducted by the
Court simultaneously with the jury's trial of the merits of the case. Summary judgment is
inappropriate at this stage because genuine questions of fact exist as to, inter alia, whether Elsa
knew she had a potential claim to the Paintings during her lifetime and whether the Museums,
as Claimants argue, had reasons to know that the Paintings were misappropriated and so are
barred from invoking laches by the doctrine of 'unclean hands."' Schoeps, 594 F. Supp. 2d at
468. A confidential settlement was reached on the morning set for trial, with the art remaining
in the museums and plaintiffs to receive "a sum certain." See Memorandum Order of March 23,
2009, at 2, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461 (2009) (No. 07-11974). The museums were willing to waive the
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Laches has two requirements: unreasonable d lay and resulting detriment.
Unreasonable delay is not measured simply by time, though a matter of
years is usually required before delay is unreasonable, while a matter of
months is seldom sufficient. Unreasonable delay depends on the facts of the
case, one court suggesting that a twenty-year delay might be reasonable in
reporting a loss if it was thought that public knowledge of the loss would
send the missing artwork underground and make it more difficult to find.300
It seems also to depend very much on the second requirement, that the
defendant has changed his position to his detriment as a result of the
delay.301
Unreasonable delay can be attributed to claimants, or to their
predecessors in interest, and this is true even though claimants or their
ancestors were unaware of their rights if they should have known them.302
Because a court is likely to attribute to claimants knowledge that they would
have discovered had they been duly diligent, current possessors will try to
prove that claimants were not duly diligent in seeking their artworks.
Claimants will allege their reasonable diligence. Alternatively, they will
argue that they would not have discovered what they need to know if they
had been more diligent. In short, some of the material that HEAR makes
irrelevant for statute of limitations purposes by making HEAR an actual
discovery statute creeps back into consideration in laches.
There are two kinds of detriment that might result from delay in bringing
suit. One is that witnesses or other evidence might no longer be available.
Courts have not required that the witnesses would have testified for the
current possessor; it is enough that a witness who could explain whether the
property was stolen or not or other circumstances can no longer testify.303
The other detriment is that the current possessor or his predecessor may
have changed his position to his detriment in reliance on his ownership.
One example might be if he invested in conservation of the work. One court
has opined that this requirement might be satisfied if the work greatly
confidentiality, but the claimants were not. See id. Judge Rakoff approved the confidentiality of
the settlement with great reluctance. See id. at 6. More detail on the case is provided at
O'DONNELL, supra note 292, at 203-215. For an illustration of some of the difficulties of
proving and defending against a laches allegation, see Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 151-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
300. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991) (dictum).
301. See Ricciardi v. Johnstown Leather, 1 A.D.3d 661, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (4 months
not enough); Weiss v. Mayflower Doughnut Corp., 135 N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 1956) (dictum
that 3 months is not enough).
302. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-306 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 500 F. App'x 6
(2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Estate of Barabash, 286 N.E.2d 268, 271 (N.Y. 1972) (laches denied
when party had no reason to know of his rights).
303. See Bakalar, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (witness dead); Wertheimer, 300 A.D.2d at 118
(witnesses dead).
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increased in value.304 The installation of special security measures would
probably be another example. No court has considered whether the
payment of insurance premiums on the work was a substantial detriment, or
whether that might be offset by the pleasure of enjoying the work during the
period covered by the insurance premiums. Another potential detriment is
that the delay in suing the current possessor's predecessor in title might have
caused the current possessor to pay fair market value for the work.
But, laches is not available when defendant knew that plaintiff intended to
assert his rights, even if he had yet to file suit.305
In New York, laches applies to actions for replevin, which before the
merger of law and equity would have been legal, not equitable, in nature.
Laches also applies whether the action is subject to a specific statute of
limitations or not.306
Other equitable defenses that are not barred by HEAR include clean
hands and balancing the hardships. Often, the clean hands defense is
asserted to prevent a laches defense from succeeding and is often rejected
(without considering whether the hands are sufficiently besmirched) on
grounds that the alleged dirty hands did not affect the opposing party307
C. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The Senate Report states that it wishes to encourage alternative dispute
resolution of these cases.308 As is usual, the Act appropriates no money for
this purpose, nor does it mandate any particular form of ADR. What it
seems to suggest is mediation, assisted by a panel of experts.309
1. Mediation and Negotiation
Mediation and negotiation are both processes where the parties reach
agreement. The significant difference between them is that in mediation,
the parties hire someone to help them reach agreement. Parties do not
always reach agreement when they negotiate or when they engage in
mediation, but they sometimes do.
One question is whether HEAR makes it more or less likely that parties
will reach agreement. The author believes that HEAR makes it more likely.
304. Zakaessian v. Zakaessian, 161 P.2d 677 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (dictum; suit to cancel a
deed, but the property had not significantly increased in value).
305. Cohen v. Krantz, 227 A.D.2d 581, 582 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (neighbor told contractor
who told defendant that neighbor objected to fence); Weiss, 135 N.E.2d at 212 (defendant
tenant knew that plaintiff was litigating with defendant's landlord over lease provision that
would have prohibited tenant's use).
306. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
307. See, e.g., In re Peters, 34 A.D.3d 29, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Wertheimer, 300 A.D.2d at
118-119; Schoeps, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
308. S. REP. No. 114-394, at 10-11 (2016).
309. See id.
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Parties are more likely to reach agreement when the outcome of litigation
is uncertain. The negotiation literature suggests that parties calculate their
Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), their Worst
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA), and their Most Likely
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (MLATNA).310 In the case of a suit
to recover Holocaust art, the best alternative is to win (including the other
side giving up). The worst alternative is to lose (including giving up
yourself). Win or lose, there are costs attached to the result. If you win, you
get or keep the artwork, but you must pay your lawyer. If you are the
claimant, your lawyer probably has the case on a contingent fee of between
one-third and one-half the value recovered. If you are the possessor, you are
probably paying your lawyer on an hourly basis. A majority of the cases that
have not been resolved based on the statute of limitations have required two
trips to the court of appeals, and one unusual case has been decided by the
court of appeals three times, the last time remanding for trial.3" In terms of
lawyering cost, that is expensive.
Notice that in this type of case, there is no MLATNA. In the minds of
each party, it may be more likely that his side will win, and under the facts of
a particular case, that may be justified. In most Holocaust art recovery cases,
predicting the results of a trial and subsequent appeal is hazardous.
By removing the certainty of victory on the statute of limitations point in
many cases and remitting the parties to trial on the merits, HEAR has
increased the uncertainty of result and thereby increased the likelihood of a
negotiated or mediated settlement.
A second factor that encourages settlement is a look at the BATNA and
WATNA. Both BATNA and WATNA have substantial costs in lawyer's fees
attached to them.312 For the current possessor, those future costs reduce
their BATNA and increase their WATNA. For the claimant with a
contingent fee contract, the potential legal costs reduce their BATNA. For
the claimant's lawyer, investing significant billable hours in a case whose
outcome is highly uncertain is a factor to consider.
One should consider other costs of litigating. Developing a case takes
time. Responding to discovery may require many hours. Then there are the
emotional costs of being involved in litigation. In addition to the
310. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 100-106 (2d ed. 1991); RUSSELL
KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY, AND STRATEGY 149-182 (2002); Jessica Notini, Effective
Alternatives Analysis In Mediation: "BATNAIWATNA" Analysis Demystified, http://www.mediate
.com/articles/notinil.cfm (last accessed Jan. 18, 2017); John Lande, BATNAMLATNA-No Big
Difference, Right?, www.mediate.com/articles/LandeJbl20l51123.cfm (last accessed Jan. 18,
2017).
311. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd sum nom,
Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affd in part & rev'd in
part, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196047 (C.D. Cal. 2012),
737 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2013) affd in part, rev'd in part & remanded, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), rev'd & remanded, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12265 (9th Cir. 2017).
312. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 60-62 (7th
ed. 2012).
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uncertainty, being the subject of cross-examination is not pleasant. The
necessity to further invest physical or emotional resources in the cost of the
litigation also induces the parties to consider settlement.
A third factor that should induce settlement is the fact that the parties may
value different things. Museums want o be able to continue displaying the
art. Private collectors do not want to see their investment in their
collections disappear. Claimants want recognition that their ancestor was
wronged. Lawyers for the claimants want their fees.
A fourth factor that should make settlement easier is the realization that
neither the claimant nor the current possessor are wrongdoers. Both are
caught in the eternal triangle of the law. The hypotenuse that is the
wrongdoer has long since departed, leaving them to pick up the pieces of the
loss. The claimant's ancestor was robbed of the art; the current possessor
bought the art from someone who appeared to have title to it, but did not,
and is no longer answerable to the current possessor because of expiration of
the statute of limitations.
2. Potential Solutions
There are two potential destinations for high-value art. Either it ends up
in a museum, or it is sent to auction where it is purchased by a private
individual or company with enormous wealth. In the latter case, it is likely
to disappear from public view into a private collection. Even worse, it may
repose in a storage container in a free port awaiting a time when it can be
sold at a profit, unviewed by anyone, with taxes on the gain not paid.313 The
claimant may wish to retain the art for sentimental or appreciative reasons,
but it is only in the rare case that he has the assets to do so.
The fact is that a middle-class person,314 or even an upper middle-class
person, cannot afford to maintain high-value art. The insurance premiums
(if insurance is available)3'5 and the required security for the art are beyond
313. Scott Reyburn, What the Panama Papers Reveal About the Art Market, N.Y. TIMES: ART &
DESIGN (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/arts/design/what-the-panama-
papers-reveal-about-the-art-market.html (Apr. 11, 2016); Graham Bowley, One of the World's
Greatest Art Collections Hides Behind This Fence, N.Y. TIMES: ART & DESIGN (May 28. 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/arts/design/one-of-the-worlds-greatest-art-collections-
hides-behind-this-fence.html.
314. The median household income in the United States for 2016 was $59,039, up 3.2% from
2015's $57, 230. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2017/
demo/p60-259.html (last accessed Feb. 28, 2017).
315. Even if hung in your home, high-end art is not effectively covered by your homeowner's
insurance policy because there are value limits on that coverage. It would need a separate rider.
Even that may not be possible because most ordinary insurance companies limit the amount of
those riders, for example, to no more than fifty percent of the insured value of the structure. If
the insured value of your home is $500,000 and you recover a painting worth $500,000, you
might obtain a rider to insure $250,000 of it. A rate that was mentioned was five cents per
thousand dollars of coverage. In the case above, one would probably do better to seek
specialized coverage for the entire value of the work. That would require an appraisal, which is
also not free.
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the budget of any but the wealthy, to say nothing of the fact that high-value
art often requires expensive conservation to maintain its value. In addition,
where the art is recovered by a person represented by a lawyer who has a
contingent fee contract, most claimants have little in the way of other idle
resources with which to pay the contingent fee without selling the art. The
final straw may be that the claimant may not be a single claimant, but plural
claimants. While we speak about a single claimant, at a remove of several
generations from the owner, there is often more than one claimant who are
heirs.316 In that case, the only way to equitably divide the art that is secured
is to sell it and divide the proceeds.
The art may end up in a museum in one of several ways. The settlement
may leave the art in the museum.317 The art may be sold to a museum,
though few museums have the resources to purchase high-value art.318
Alternatively, the art may be purchased by a private person who later
donates it to a museum. This alternative is less certain. The major incentive
for museum donations is the charitable deduction from either the income or
estate tax. 3 19 That deduction only benefits United States taxpayers. Many
buyers in today's art market are nonresident aliens, for whom United States
tax inducements are irrelevant.320 Even with United States taxpayers, the
value of a charitable deduction is reduced when tax rates are reduced, when
the number of people who take the standard income tax deduction increases,
and when the exemption from the estate tax increases, all of which occurred
for taxable years beginning January 1, 2018.
From a public policy viewpoint, having a work disappear into a private
collection is not desirable. One of the reasons for special treatment of art is
to make it accessible to the general public. Given a choice between putting
art in a museum where it will be on public view or at least accessible to
316. There were nine heirs in Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996,
n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007); Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805
(N.D. Ohio 2006).
317. See, e.g., Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 594 F.Supp.2d 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
318. Two exceptions seem to be the Getty Museum in Los Angeles and the Neue Galerie in
New York. Jori Finkel, Getty Museum Buys Art by Michelangelo, Parmigianino and More, N.Y.
TIMES: ART & DESIGN (Jul. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/arts/design/
getty-museum-buys-art-by-michelangelo-parmigianino-and-more.html (estimated at
$100,000,000); Graham Bowley, Neu Galerie Returns Painting Seized by Nazis and Then Rebuys It
in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES: ART & DESIGN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
28/arts/design/neue-galerie-returns-painting-seized-by-nazis-and-then-rebuys-it-in-settlement
.html (estimated at $1,000,000). While the purchase of Gustave Klimt's Portrait ofAdele Bloch-
Bauer I, "The Golden Portrait" was by Ronald Lauder, the Neue Galerie is the beneficiary.
Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, A Record, for a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES: ART &
DESIGN (June 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/arts/design/19klim.html.
319. 26 I.R.C. § 170, 2055 (2015).
320. In some cases, tax benefits are irrelevant. See, e.g., http://www.cbsnews.com/news/doing-
the-right-thing-with-stolen-art/, last accessed 20 July 2017.
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scholars, and having it subject to the whim of a private individual, one
should always prefer the museum solution.321
a. Claimant and Private Collector
In the typical case between the claimant and a private collector, the
whereabouts of the work is usually discovered when the work is sent to an
auction house for sale.322 The most likely settlement in that case, because
the current possessor wants to sell the work and the claimant cannot afford
to keep it, is to sell the work and divide the proceeds.323 Each party, if a
United States citizen or resident, will pay tax on his gain, though the amount
of the gain will differ depending on the time and method of acquisition of
the interest.324
A more desirable settlement, if the parties can afford it, would be to offer
the work to a museum in a private sale at a bargain price, with the parties
agreeing to how they will divide the sales price and the charitable
deduction.325
b. Claimant and Museum
In the more common case where the dispute is between the claimant and a
museum, there is an opportunity for creative negotiation. The museum
321. Alyssa R. Bickford, Nazi-Looted Art: Preserving a Legacy, 49 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 115,
130-132 (2017); Herbert Lazerow, Mastering Art Law 13 (2015).
322. See e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 550 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1380
(S.D. Ind. 1989); Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie's, Inc., No. 98CV7664(KMW), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999).
323. A split was negotiated between the heirs of Heinrich and Anna Maria Graf and a trust set
up in the will of the current possessor over Marieschi's "La Punta Della Dogana e San Giorgio
Maggiore." The work was to have been sold at auction and the proceeds shared, though news
articles do not reveal the percentage that each will receive. Dalya Alberge, Case of Venetian
masterpiece looted by Nazis closed 80 years on, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2017), https://www
.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/may/27/painting-looted-nazis-anschluss-auction-veneti
an-michele-marieschi.
324. Artwork is taxed at a maximum capital gains rate of twenty-eight percent on collectibles.
INT. REV. CODE of 1986 § 1(h)(3), (4). The basis will be the purchase price if bought, under
§ 1012; if received by bequest, the fair market value on the date of death or the alternate
valuation date, under § 1014; and different computations apply under § 1015 if received as a
gift, depending on whether the property is sold at a gain or at a loss. A person who is not a
United States citizen or resident is unlikely to be taxed by the United States even if the property
is sold in the United States, unless the seller is in the business of selling art.
325. A slight variation of this settlement occurred for Edgar Degas' Landscape with
Smokestacks, claimed by the Gutmann heirs from Daniel Searle, who bought it in 1987. The
parties agreed that each owned half the work, that Searle would donate his half to the Art
Institute of Chicago, which would buy the half-interest of the Gutmann heirs. O'DONNELL,
supra note 292, at 98-101. The museum's purchase benefited Searle indirectly. It is always
difficult to value the donation of a unique object. It is even more difficult to value a fractional
interest in a unique object. The museum's purchase of the half interest from the Gutmann heirs
established the fair market value of the interest that Searle donated for purposes of his
charitable deduction.
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would like to keep the work on display, but few museums have giant
acquisition budgets. Buying the work outright at its current fair market
value is usually not an option. The claimant would like public recognition of
the wrong done to his ancestor and would like that recognition symbolized
with some cash.
One potential solution would be for the museum to acknowledge the
wrong done to the claimant's ancestor in a permanent way, by putting the
history of the artwork on the museum sign that identifies it and on the
museum website. The history of the family's persecution is sometimes
detailed. The museum might make a modest payment to the claimant, and
the claimant might donate the artwork to the museum, thereby securing a
charitable deduction for the difference between the fair market value of the
work and the amount the claimant received.326 The charitable contribution
might be larger than the claimant could use in the year it is given, but any
unused amount can be carried forward to the five succeeding years.327 In
such a case, claimants should consider whether it is better to receive a lump
sum, or periodic payments, perhaps in the form of a life annuity.
Such resolutions can be expressed in a variety of ways.328 In one
settlement, the current possessor University museum formally returned
Pissarro's "La Bergdre" to the French resident heir of the original owner.329
The University had received the painting as a bequest.330 The settlement
provided for the painting to rotate between display at the University
museum and display at a museum in France.331 The claimant promised to
326. 26 I.R.C. § 170. This would be a transaction that combined a sale of part of the interest
and a charitable gift of the rest. Diedrich v. C.I.R., 457 U.S. 191 (1982) (part sale, part gift
when donee agreed to pay donor's gift tax).
327. 26 I.R.C. § 170(d).
328. A list of thirty-two known restorations or settlements by museums is found at, Frankel &
Forrest, supra note 292, at 279, 329-335.
329. Randy Ellis & Silas Allen, University of Oklahoma Settlement Agreement Revealed in Nazi-
looted Art Case, THE OKLAHOMAN (Feb. 23, 2016, 11:30 AM), http://newsok.com/article/
5480678.
3 3 0. See id.
331. See id. One wonders whether the University considered the possibility that during one of
the painting's sojourns in France, the French government might classify it as a national treasure
and prohibit its export, thereby terminating the benefit that the University was promised in the
settlement. For an analogous situation, see Ramier, supra note 297, at 337, where a French
citizen, bought a Van Gogh in New York in 1955, brought it to France in 1957, and was denied
permission to take it to his Geneva home in 1989, as France in that year classified it as a
national treasure. He recovered a substantial judgment, in part because of procedural
irregularities, because confining the painting to France reduced its value by roughly eighty-five
percent. See id. Such classification is authorized by, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, supra note 292, art. 4(a), as property created within French
territory by a French resident; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(f), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.NT.S. 188; and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(Consolidated), art. 30, Oct. 11, 1997, OJ.C.E. 97/C 340/03.
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give or bequeath the painting to a French museum.332
In another, the North Carolina Museum of Art restored Lucas Cranach
the Elder's "Madonna and Child with Landscape" to the grandnieces of
Philip von Gumpfretz, who sold it to the museum for half its fair market
value, $600,000.333 An exhibition was planned to explain the history of the
painting and honor Mr. Von Gumpfretz and his heirs.334 The Museum had
received the painting as a gift.335
The Neue Galerie acknowledged the ownership of Schmidt-Rottluff's
"Nude," then purchased it from the heirs for its fair market value.336
The Bavarian State Paintings Collection restored "The Raising of
Lazarus" that had been in Herman Godring's collection, then purchased it,
with the understanding that a plaque will detail the restitution and the fate of
the family.337
It needs to be emphasized that the likelihood of reaching an eventual
settlement may depend on the stances of the parties, beginning when the
claimant approaches the current possessor. If the claimant approaches the
current possessor as a thief, and the current possessor communicates that he
thinks the claimant is engaging in extortion, settlement will be difficult. If
the claimant treats the current possessor as someone who has rendered a
valuable service by protecting and conserving the artwork for years, and the
current possessor treats the claimant's approach as something that needs to
be verified and promptly devotes assets to that verification, agreement is
much more likely.
VI. Net Effect of HEAR
It is always hazardous to predict the effect of legislation before courts have
had the opportunity to construe it. Nevertheless, the above analysis leads
one to conclude that it will have little effect in New York, the most popular
state for litigating Holocaust recovery cases. The statute of limitations there
is seldom a bar to pursuing those cases because of the demand-and-refusal
rule. Its practical result in an "actual discovery" jurisdiction is also likely to
be minimal, because most people will claim property once they actually
332. Ellis & Allen, supra note 329. For more detail on the litigation that preceded the
settlement, see O'DONNELL, supra note 292, at 216-223.
333. Ellis & Allen, supra note 329.
334. CBS, supra note 320.
3 3 5. See id.
336. Bowley, supra note 318. A bargain for both sides. The Galerie did not pay the twenty
percent buyer's commission that most auction houses charge, and the seller did not pay a similar
seller's commission. See id. Neither was subject to the potential vicissitudes of an auction
where the price can vary significantly from fair market value.
337. Catherine Hickley, Painting From Goering's Collection Is Returned to Banker's Heirs, N.Y.
TIMES: ART & DESIGN July, 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2txjrYQ; Bavarian State Painting
Collections restitutes 'The Rising of Lazarus', ART DAILY, http://artdaily.com/news/97660/
Bavarian-State-Painting-Collections-restitutes%E2 % 80%94The-Raising-of-Lazarus-#.WXaQ
qaKQxjU (last accessed Jan. 20, 2017).
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discover who has it and that they are entitled to it. Its effect in states
following the traditional rule, that a cause of action accrues when the item is
taken and brought into the jurisdiction, should likewise be minimal, because
in most of those jurisdictions the current possessor would have long ago
acquired title by adverse possession. Any attempt to apply HEAR to
lengthen the statute of limitations for those properties would be an
unconstitutional taking of the property barred by the Fifth Amendment.
HEAR is likely to have a significant effect in those states following the
discovery rule. The change from discovery with all its requirements of
diligence and determination of when one should have discovered the
appropriate facts to actual discovery is likely to require the litigation or
settlement of many more cases.
HEAR's effects are further reduced by its strict limitation to takings from
persecuted groups by specified institutions or people pursuant to Nazi
ideology.
HEAR is also likely to make litigation more expensive by shifting from the
simple question of whether the statute of limitations has expired to the
question of whether the claimant is barred by the doctrine of laches, with its
requirement of discovery and a separate trial on that issue.
The law is likely to have the effect of encouraging more settlements by
mediation and negotiation. It creates more uncertainty of result and it
increases the cost of litigating, which should encourage settlements.
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